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Feminist accounts of how “the personal” is used in feminist critical nonfiction have theorized that 
the effect of the personal is to connect the writer with readers who share a sense of her investment 
in the subject matter. Looking at two recent, prominent works about gender and sexuality, and race, 
respectively that combine genres of criticism and narrative memoir – Maggie Nelson’s The 
Argonauts and Ta-Nehisi Coates’s Between the World and Me – this paper considers how personal 
writing is shaped not by readers it wants to connect to, but by anxious, even dreadful, anticipation 
of being read by its most resistant and vitriolic readers. I argue that Nelson’s and Coates’s formally 
dexterous choices – particularly their respective decisions to address their narratives to second 
person intimates – have been shaped in response to their understandings of what I call the 
antagonistic reader, a reader whose cognitive and emotional resistance to the writer’s words poses a 
threat to the text.   
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There’s a tenor to a lot of recent popular writing about feminism that I think is crystallized 
by the title of novelist Chimamanda Ngozi Adichie’s (decoratively bound, cutely small) book, once 
a TED Talk, We Should All Be Feminists. To be under the age of 35 and known in your circle of 
family and friends (at least, in the kind of circle for whom popularity is measured by the New York 
Times Bestseller List) as a feminist is to receive this book as a gift many times. The titles in this 
trend pitch themselves as a friendly, or friendlier, feminism, or anti-racism; a list of its exemplars 
includes things like bell hooks’ Feminism Is for Everybody, the popular blog “Everyday 
Feminism,” Caitlin Moran’s How to Be a Woman, Roxane Gay’s Bad Feminist, Ileoma Ojuo’s So 
You Want to Talk About Race. By virtue of the energy of their desire to be easy, accessible, and 
welcoming, the writers of friendly feminism betray an anxiety about reaching their audience. They 
recognize feminism and anti-racism have an unusual amount of difficulty reaching the number of 
listeners who should, by rights, be theirs; for example, Ojuo writes, “These are very scary times for 
a lot of people who are just now realizing that America is not, and has never been, the melting-pot 
utopia that their parents and teachers told them it was…This is not just a gap in experience in 
viewpoint. The Grand Canyon is a gap. This is a chasm you could drop entire solar systems into” 
(“Introduction,” Kindle Edition). But the shared structures of friendly feminism are defined by a 
kind of optimism about this resistance; they approach it by offering what they see as simpler, 
clearer explanation and with a more relatable voice, a voice that puts a friendly face up against the 
scare words “Black” and “feminist.” I used to think just like you, the texts say to their reader. 
Adichie, for example, quips: “At some point I was a Happy African Feminist Who Does Not Hate 
Men And Who Likes to Wear Lip Gloss And High Heels For Herself And Not For Men” (10). 
They try and lower the barrier for entry into dialogues that (they worry) might have seemed too 
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intimidating: “I am not terribly well versed in feminist history. I am not as well read in key feminist 
texts as I would like to be,” Roxane Gay writes (xi). If their work observes anxiously a knowledge 
gap and a reluctance in the field of readers, their remedies for this gap show that they see it as a 
straightforward phenomenon of obliviousness and misunderstanding. It’s an ignorance that can be 
dispelled with clarity and simplicity, but most of all, it’s an ignorance that can be dispelled by 
offering up themselves. Personal details and personal voice, the style implies, forge personal 
connection with a reader whose intellectual distance from the writer is really just a space created by 
unfamiliarity and emotional distance for bias to rush in. “But no matter how daunting, you are here 
because you want to hear and you want to be heard,” Ojuo writes, “We can find our way to each 
other… And it all starts with a conversation” (“Introduction,” Kindle Edition). 
Like the spate of books I’m calling friendly feminism, Maggie Nelson’s The Argonauts and 
Ta-Nehisi Coates’s Between the World and Me, two of the most prominent and well-received 
popular books about identity published in the last five years, are works of personal nonfiction, 
which offer up autobiographical details of the writer’s life, even intimate details of the author’s life, 
in the service of theorizing (though in the interest of accessibility, writers of the former category 
might say explaining) gender and sexuality, or race, respectively. All of them emerge out of 
feminist methodology that insists on thinking about gender and sexuality through experience, “the 
personal,” and the body, and a tradition of feminist writing that might be called critical memoir, 
narrative essay, personal criticism, autotheory (as Nelson calls The Argonauts). The antecedents of 
the kind of hybrid writing The Argonauts and Between the World and Me represent – writing 
bounded by a narrative arc but moved by logical thought; writing that thinks through anecdotes; 
writing that is consciously in dialogue with scholarly discourse – can be traced back (at least) to 
Virginia Woolf’s essays, and might include writers like Adrienne Rich, Audre Lorde, Alice 
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Walker, Patricia Williams, Gloria Anzaldúa, and Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick – a very incomplete list.1  
It is difficult to draw a line around this tradition and definitively list its membership, because it is 
difficult to say what kinds of writing count as personal. Coates, for example, is usually seen as 
writing out of the tradition of black autobiography, especially in the vein of James Baldwin; The 
Fire Next Time is made up of two critical essays, one of which is addressed to his nephew as an 
entrée into the realities of racism, that use autobiography and anecdote to think through race and 
religion. It is a personal essay, but its personal-ness is less talked about than, say, Audre Lorde’s 
personal-ness, either because feminist writing consciously cultivates attention to personal 
experience, or because “the personal” is coded female, and is only problematic when a woman is 
doing it (or, rather, both, since feminist theorizing about the personal arose to reclaim women’s 
experience from its pejorative). In her essay “Getting Personal: Autobiography as Cultural 
Criticism” accounting for the late 70s and 80s trend of introducing personal elements to scholarly 
writing, Nancy K. Miller lays out the following possible definitions of the personal: it may be the 
inclusion of autobiographical facts; it may be a “certain intensity in the lending of the self,’ to the 
subject matter and act of writing, as Mary Ann Caws theorizes; it may be rhetorical personality, a 
writing style; it may be the decision to write in the subjective first person; it may mean speaking 
from the positional, speaking for or as one’s identity category (2, 6, 9, 14, 16). It is equally 
difficult, and not unrelatedly difficult, to delineate what counts as critical: feminist literary critics, 
for example, have insisted that memoir alone is a kind of theoretical exercise, that recording 
                                                     
1The work these writers produced shares prominent features with The Argonauts and Between the World and Me. 
Virginia Woolf’s A Room of One’s Own makes narrative the intellectual moves of its speaking “I.” Adrienne Rich’s Of 
Woman Born interweaves her personal experiences as mother with theorizing and criticism of theorizing about 
patriarchy, motherhood, and childbirth. Audre Lorde conceives of the body as the ultimate, physical landing for racism 
and also as the site from which to theorize politics in The Cancer Journals, and uses her own bodily experience with 
breast cancer to do so. Patricia Williams’ The Alchemy of Race and Rights uses anecdote to think legal theory. Gloria 
Anzaldúa’s Borderlands/La Frontera is one of the most generically hybrid texts, combining history, memoir, poetry, 
and passages in both English and Spanish. Eve Sedgwick similarly combines recovered documents of her own writing, 
poetry, reportage, and theory in works like “A Poem is Being Written” and A Dialogue on Love.  
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women’s lives is the basis of a critical feminist politics. Simone de Beauvoir’s Memoirs of a 
Dutiful Daughter, which is a straightforwardly chronological and novelistic narrative of her 
childhood and which many feminists cite for having been an early model for life beyond normative 
femininity, is also a critique of bourgeois ideology, elaborated through the occasions and events in 
her life and education that gave rise to new and competing intellectual positions – much the way 
Coates recounts how one moment in his life gave rise to a commitment to black nationalism, the 
next, to racial deconstruction, and so on. 
Theoretical accounts of personal criticism (or critical memoir, or narrative essay, or 
autotheory) trying to define “the personal” and identify what it’s doing within or in conjunction 
with “the critical” or “the theoretical” suggest that what the personal does in these texts is 
something like what the friendly feminists imagine it will do: it connects with the reader. In her 
essay “Me and My Shadow,” a critique of academic prose’s cold postures and a manifesto for 
reuniting the thinking and feeling self, Jane Tompkins writes: 
Sometimes, when a writer introduces some personal bit of story into an essay, I can hardly 
contain my pleasure. I love writers who write about their own experience. I feel I’m being 
nourished by them, that I’m being allowed to enter into a personal relationship with them, 
that I can match my own experience with theirs, feel cousin to them, and say, yes, that’s 
how it is. (24) 
 
In Women of Bloomsbury, Caws defines personal criticism as “a willing, knowledgeable, 
outspoken involvement on the part of the critic with the subject matter, and an invitation extended 
to the potential reader to participate in the interweaving and construction of the ongoing 
conversation this criticism can be, even as it remains a text” (emphasis mine) (Miller, 24). Picking 
up this idea that personal criticism is fundamentally engaged criticism, Miller writes:  
By the risks of its writing, personal criticism embodies a pact, like the ‘autobiographical 
pact’ binding writer to reader in the fabulation of self-truth, that what is at stake matters 
also to others: somewhere in the self-fiction of the personal voice is a belief that the writing 
is worth the risk. In this sense, by turning its authorial voice into a spectacle, personal 
writing theorizes the stakes of its own performance: a personal materialism. (24) 
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Writing personally showcases the writer’s emotional investment in what she’s writing about, in the 
belief that what she’s writing about matters to readers too. In all three of these accounts, “the 
personal” in personal writing reaches out to the reader, invites some kind of identification or at 
least activates a shared care, and risks itself in order to do so. The question is: does the personal 
impulse seek to connect to all readers? What kind of readers does this account of the personal 
implicitly imagine? Is connection always desirable?  
The Argonauts and Between the World and Me are books that seem to take pains to 
announce are not “for” everybody – that, in fact, they’re hardly for anybody. Much of the 
Argonauts is conducted as a kind of remembered conversation; it’s addressed to “you,” to Harry 
Dodge, her queerly gendered partner whose transition the narrative recounts, remembering what 
“I” said, and what “you” said, through anecdotes about Nelson’s past and about their shared past: it 
presents itself as a text between us, for us. Nelson’s writing was celebrated in most reviews for the 
nuance it achieves through narrative, for, in one critic’s words, “not telling its readers how to be 
but offering one picture of what it might be like” to live outside gender and sexual boundaries – 
and yet, she disclaims both a desire to convince others, and a desire to model for others: “I don’t 
want to represent anything. At the same time, every word I write could be read as some kind of 
defense, or assertion of value, of whatever it is that I am…I am interested in offering up my 
experiences and performing my particular manner of thinking, for whatever they are worth…But I 
have never been less interested in arguing for the rightness, much less the righteousness, of any 
particular position or orientation” (Ruby; The Argonauts, 97). Nelson is as agnostic about her 
audience’s reception of the text as it is possible for a person who has taken pains to publish 
something can be. Between the World and Me is also written to a specific second person: it is 
following Baldwin, it is addressed as a letter to his son. When asked, Coates has repeatedly said in 
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interviews that he was surprised by how many people read the book at all, surprised that white 
people were interested in his work, and that he expected his audience – who he imagined to be 
mostly young black men – to be as limited as the audience of his first memoir, The Beautiful 
Struggle, was (León, Wallace-Wells, Allen). 
You could read these declarations of disinterest completely literally, and take at face value 
that Nelson and Coates simply aren’t interested in addressing unsympathetic or bigoted readers, 
that they’re just writing for Samori and Harry Dodge, or for the communities they represent, or 
even more intimately, for themselves, and to serve their own understanding, and they just happened 
to publish that exercise, for whatever it’s worth. There is an ethics to those aims: an admirable 
humility in one’s writing powers, a political commitment to not “congeal difference into a single 
figure,” yourself, as Nelson puts it, and a virtue in attending to the audience whose disadvantage 
makes their needs for your work more acute (78). Coates, in fact, faced strident criticism from 
prominent black thinkers for finding a wide readership among white readers. In that vein, you 
could also read Coates’s and Nelson’s demurring completely pessimistically, as an insincere cover 
for pandering to a majoritarian audience and bolstering sales, both of which these books did in 
outsize numbers. I want to do neither. I think Coates’s and Nelson’s rhetorical refusal of the reader, 
or of most readers, is best read as both performed and performative, without being insincere: their 
mode of address emerges from the same anxiety about reaching readers that animates friendly 
feminism’s friendliness, but it represents a more dexterous approach, occasioned by Coates’s and 
Nelson’s deeper sense of the readers’ listening problem.  
Throughout The Argonauts and Between the World and Me, Nelson and Coates recount 
encounters with interlocutors who model the dynamics of that more intractable listening problem, 
which I call antagonistic reading. Antagonistic reading is a practice of 
reading/listening/interpreting with a cognitive and emotional resistance that goes beyond the 
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“usual” ignorance or misunderstanding that could be addressed by the friendly feminists’ clarity, 
explanation, and accessibility. It is not the same thing as antagonism, a responsive contrary 
position. Antagonistic reading can’t be a responsive contrary position because what it 
fundamentally is is the mental distortion, disruption, or blocking of the speaker’s testimony in the 
first place before the reader has even “really” absorbed it. Recent scholarship in social 
epistemology, which builds on feminist philosophy of science’s insights about how social position 
structures (and limits) knowledge, has given various accounts of how what I’m calling antagonistic 
reading might work epistemologically, accounts of ignorance as a phenomenon that doesn’t result 
from being negligent about proper epistemic practice, but as a substantive epistemic practice in 
itself, one that is socially and structurally determined.2 But my purpose is not to say that Coates’s 
and Nelson’s memoirs match one or another theoretical account of how this resistance – this 
“willful ignorance,” “white ignorance,” “silencing” – works epistemically, or psychologically, so 
much as to examine how their texts participate in the theorizing of raced and gendered ignorance 
through their own theories of antagonistic reading, and to argue that the anticipation of these 
antagonistic readers, however Coates and Nelson each conceive them, is a shaping force on The 
Argonauts and Between the World and Me.3 
Reader response theories have argued in different ways for a criticism focused on the 
reader, based on the idea that the act of reading animates or even creates the text, that the text 
really exists in the mind of the readers, or the texts really exist multiply in the minds of readers. 
This is not the sense in which I mean the antagonistic reader shapes these texts. I mean that Nelson 
and Coates’s anticipation of being read by antagonistic readers, and their imaginative “dialogue” 
with such readers, influenced how they chose to write. This interpretive approach is based on an 
                                                     
2For perspectives from feminist epistemology and feminist philosophy of science on knowledge and social position, see 
Harding and Haraway. For theories of ignorance as an epistemic practice, see Alcoff. 
3 For willful ignorance, see Alcoff. For white ignorance, see Mills. For silencing, see Hornsby and Langton. 
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understanding of writing and reading as a single communicative and mutually constructing process 
that comes from Mikhail Bakhtin’s late essay, “The Problem of Speech Genres.” The essay argues 
that an understanding of linguistic communication needs to take into consideration all forms of 
“speech genres,” from literary genres – a complex and developed (“secondary”) form – to daily 
interactions, which have their own generic forms that partly determine an individual’s style of 
speech. For Bakhtin, all language is determined in its style, content and structure by the sphere of 
communication, which includes the person being spoken to, the genre of speech (i.e. the academic 
essay, the daily rejoinder), conventions of the national language, the individual speaker. The basic 
unit of communication, he writes, is not the sentence, as various schools in linguistics have argued, 
but the utterance, which is defined by a change in the speaking subject. A tweet is an utterance. A 
novel is an utterance. Our fluency in our linguistic world is achieved through our fluency with 
speech genres, which vary from “rigid and trite” to “flexible, plastic and creative,” and which we 
absorb and use in daily life without suspecting they exist. I do not have to invent from scratch each 
utterance I will make when I order a coffee and a coffee shop: I have speech genres such as 
“greeting” and “refusal” and “thanks” at hand, and my own expressive style has, at least in the 
speech constructed by this sphere of communication, very little influence over what I say. My 
perception of generic forms in other people’s speech allows me to predict the structure of their 
utterances, to perceive their “speech will,” to predict when their utterance will end, and to begin 
actively absorbing and formulating my response as it is ongoing. Every utterance – including 
complex secondary genres such as novels (or critical memoirs), which absorb and assemble daily 
and primary utterances – is involved in an active and mutual process of listening and responding:  
The utterance is related not only to the preceding, but also to the subsequent links in the 
chain of speech communion. When a speaker is creating an utterance, of course, these links 
do not exist. But from the very beginning, the utterance is constructed while taking into 
account possible responsive reactions, for whose sake, in essence, it is actually created. As 
we know, the role of others for whom the utterance is constructed is extremely great. We 
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have already said that the role of these others, for whom my thought becomes actual 
thought for the first time (and thus also for my own self as well) is not that of passive 
listeners, but of active participants in speech communication. (94) 
 
Put simply, as Coates and Nelson formulate the utterances that are Between the World and Me and 
The Argonauts, they project images of the readers to whom they were communicating, a projection 
which has a profound shaping role on the text. The readers they project, and their sense of possible 
responsive reactions, comes from past dialogues they’ve had on race, past responses they’ve 
received or witnessed. Their predictive sense of the anticipated antagonistic reader is formed by 
historical, real antagonistic readers, whose genre of response they are already familiar with. 
Similarly, what they are able to say about race and gender is built on what people have said in the 
past about race and gender, and they are either consciously or unconsciously responsive themselves 
to those preceding utterances.  
The responsiveness of The Argonauts and Between the World and Me is pointedly 
conscious. Both texts are presented literally as responses: Coates presents Between the World and 
Me as a response to the moment when his son Samori found out that Michael Brown’s killer would 
not be indicted and said, “I’ve got to go,” and went to his room (11). The Argonauts presents itself 
as a response to Harry’s request for it: “You’ve written about all parts of your life except this, 
except the queer part, you said. Give me a break, I said back, I haven’t written about it yet” (32). 
And both texts are patently in conversation with thinkers about race, or gender and sexuality, who 
came before them – in Nelson’s case, the words of the queer and psychoanalytic thinkers who she 
is in dialogue with are literally tumbled into her text, absorbed into her own words and 
distinguished only by italics. And both texts recount anecdotes of discursive and interpretive 
interactions with interlocutors who practice antagonistic reading.  
The cast of antagonistic readers Nelson assembles differ from the array Coates assembles. 
But both authors conceive of a destructive process of reading that operates in a similar way: the 
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interpretive action of the antagonistic reader turns on reducing the figure of the author into a 
caricature, creating, as Nelson puts it, quoting Eve Sedgwick, “a hologram bearing their name,” 
one whose words are entailed by and thus conflated with that holographic identity. This neat 
reduction and entailment allows the reader to effectively erase the author’s word and to rewrite the 
meaning of the exchange according to their own need. Coates and Nelson represent the need 
driving these interactions differently For Nelson, the antagonistic reader operates by a kind of zero-
sum economy of visibility in which their visibility – as [bona fide] radical, intellectual, man – is 
obscurely threatened when certain speakers make claims to visibility through speech. In the world 
of Between the World and Me, antagonistic readers are readers who operate by the logic of 
whiteness (as I’ll discuss, this is not the same as “readers who are white,” since part of Coates’s 
project is to deconstruct and denaturalize race), and the need that motivates them is the need for 
absolution. Without collapsing their differences, these accounts both see antagonistic reading as a 
drive to shore up something like the reader’s sense of legitimacy – whether existential or moral. 
Both see this drive as intimately caught up in the workings of identity. 
Though their gestures of refusal seem to want to keep the sphere of their readership to those 
who will identify with their personal stakes in the subject matter – both of which are very, very 
high; Nelson is writing, in a sense, for her marriage; Coates, for his life and his son’s – both 
understand the antagonistic reader as presenting threats that preclude them from doing so. Instead, 
their address to a specific reader is the means by which they attempt to pre-empt and redirect the 
antagonistic reader’s reading. Their gesture of writing to “you” both addresses the reader more 
directly – calling up even one reader concretely dissolves the haze of anonymity behind which the 
narrate of a general, universalized address hides, reminding you of your personal presence as a 
reader – even as they turn away from “you” to address the specific recipient, Harry or Samori. The 
effect is that the reader is both contained in and refused by the “you.” In Nelson, the second person 
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address to Harry refuses the antagonistic reader by, to use her word, metabolizing the antagonistic 
reader – into the figure of Harry, who performs the erasing impulse the antagonistic reader feels 
pre-emptively, lovingly, in the form of edits. Her second person address is a kind of controlled 
submission to the antagonistic reader. Coates’s “you” provokes and then ostentatiously refuses the 
reader, creating a sense that he has accused the reader but then denying the reader the grounds on 
which to respond or defend themselves.  
  
Maggie Nelson’s The Argonauts: Submission 
I. Object Lessons and the Horrible Thing: Dread of the Antagonistic Reader 
The Argonauts is populated with figures of the antagonistic reader. First: Rosalind Krauss, 
the art historian. Nelson recalls attending a seminar at the CUNY Graduate Center, where she was 
as a PhD candidate, at which Jane Gallop and Rosalind Krauss had been invited to speak. Nelson 
narrates that Gallop presented photographs her husband had taken of her and their child – some of 
them quite intimate (in the bathtub, lounging naked, perhaps most vulnerably, in a favorite, ugly 
shirt) – in order to explore photography from the perspective of being the photographed subject. 
She coupled that understanding of photography “from the inside” with a discussion of motherhood, 
another subject position often seen as too personal, too subjective to speak to its own condition. 
Krauss’ presentation savaged Gallop’s: 
The room thickened with the sound of one keenly intelligent woman taking another down. 
Dismembering her, really. Krauss excoriated Gallop for taking her own personal situation 
as subject matter, accused her of having an almost willful blindness to photography’s long 
history. She alleged – or so I recall her alleging – that Gallop had misused Barthes, had 
failed to place her investigation in relation to any lineage of family photography, had 
punted on the most basic aesthetic concepts in art history, and so on. But the tacit 
undercurrent of her argument as I felt it, was that Gallop’s maternity had rotted her mind – 
besotted it with the narcissism that makes one think that an utterly ordinary experience 
shared by countless others is somehow unique, or uniquely interesting. (41) 
 
Second: certain readers of Judith Butler. Nelson quotes Butler as saying, “It’s painful for 
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me that I wrote a whole book calling into question identity politics, only then to be constituted as a 
token of lesbian identity” (53). Butler wonders if people didn’t really read the book, or if the 
commodification of identity politics was powerful enough to overtake and absorb whatever she had 
actually written. Nelson writes, in a rare moment in which her endless intellectual sympathy runs 
dry:  
I think Butler is generous to name the diffuse “commodification of identity” as the problem. 
Less generously, I’d say that the simple fact that she’s a lesbian is so blinding for some, that 
whatever words come out of her mouth – whatever words come out of the lesbian’s mouth, 
whatever ideas spout from her head – certain listeners hear only one thing: lesbian, lesbian, 
lesbian. It’s a quick step from there to discounting the lesbian – or, for that matter, anyone 
who refuses to slip quietly into a postracial future that resembles all too closely the racist 
past and present – as identitarian, when it’s actually the listener who cannot get beyond the 
identity that he has imputed to the speaker. Calling the speaker identitarian then serves as 
an efficient excuse not to listen to her, in which case the listener can resume his role as 
speaker. And then we can scamper off to yet another conference with a keynote address by 
Jacques Rancière, Alain Badiou, Slavoj Žižek, at which we can meditate on Self and Other, 
grapple with radical difference, exalt the deciveness of the Two, and shame the 
unsophisticated identitarians, all at the feet of yet another great white man pontificating 
from the podium, just as we’ve done for centuries. (54) 
 
Third: the patrician playwright, who, at a Q&A on Nelson’s book tour for The Art of 
Cruelty raises his hand and says “I can’t help but notice that you’re with child, which leads me to 
the question – how did you handle working on all this dark material [sadism, masochism, cruelty, 
violence, and so on] in your condition?” Nelson writes:  
Ah yes, I think, digging a knee into the podium. Leave it to the old patrician white guy to 
call the lady speaker back to her body, so that no one misses the spectacle of that wild 
oxymoron, the pregnant woman who thinks. Which is really just a pumped-up version of 
that more general oxymoron, a woman who thinks. 
 
As if anyone was missing the spectacle anyway. As if a similar scene didn’t recur at nearly 
every location of my so-called book tour. As if when I myself see pregnant women in the 
public sphere, there isn’t a kind of drumming in my mind that threatens to drown out all 
else: pregnant, pregnant, pregnant…(91). 
 
Fourth: right-wing culture warriors. Nelson recounts an incident in 1991 in which the title 
of a talk Eve Sedgwick was giving, “Jane Austen and the Masturbating Girl,” was published in an 
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MLA program and unleashed a wave of criticism of her depravity, before the content of the talk 
had even been written.  
About learning she was ill just as the ‘journalistic hologram bearing [her] name’ became the 
object of ugly vitriol, [Sedgwick] writes: “I don’t know a gentler way to say it than that at a 
time when I’ve needed to make especially deep draughts on the reservoir of a desire to live 
and thrive, that resource has shown the cumulative effects of my culture’s wasting depletion 
of it.” She then names a few of the “thousand things [that] make it impossible to mistake 
the verdict on queer lives and on women’s lives, as on the lives of those who are poor or 
who are not white.” This verdict can become a chorus of voices in our heads, standing by to 
inhibit our capacity to contend with illness, dread, and devaluation. “[These voices] speak 
to us,” Sedgwick says. “They have an amazing clarity.” (113) 
 
Fifth: Nelson’s stalker of sorts – a balding, middle-aged man in his fifties carrying an 
attaché case. A few months before Iggy is conceived, a man left a voice mail on her phone at work 
saying her aunt, who was murdered as a young law student in 1969, “got what she deserved.” The 
man was “obsessed with Jane’s murder, and with me as someone who had written about it” (114). 
The man showed up at the university’s campus and began to ask for Nelson. Nelson couldn’t shake 
the feeling that she has materialized this man herself: 
…it was I [not her mother] who insisted on writing about Jane’s murder, and while I 
knew intellectually that I wasn’t responsible for this man’s actions any more than Jane was 
for her murder (as the caller had indicated), my less enlightened self felt sick with a sense 
of late-breaking comeuppance. I had summoned the horrible thing, and now here he was, 
attaché case in hand. It wasn’t long before my image of him merged with that of Jared Lee 
Loughner, the man who, exactly two weeks prior, had walked up to Representative Gabby 
Giffords in a Safeway parking lot in Tucson, Arizona, and shot her, along with eighteen 
others. A form letter from Giffords was found in Loughner’s home with the words ‘Die, 
Bitch,’ scrawled on it; Loughner was known for saying that women should not hold 
positions of power. 
 
It doesn’t matter to me if both these men are mad. Their voices still have clarity. 
(118) 
 
 The cast of characters in these examples who conduct a series of communication failures 
that range from bothersome to brutal do so by a shared logic: these listeners can only hear whatever 
their version is of lesbian, lesbian, lesbian. Their antagonism circumscribes and reduces the figure 
of the author and focuses a myopic attention on this creation, this figure who is “a hologram 
14  
bearing her name.” Nelson’s vision of Butler’s readers is that they treat the reductive identity of the 
lesbian is treated as though it naturally entails certain discursive positions, certain beliefs. They 
produce a “natural” joining of author and idea that makes the reduction of one conveniently the 
reduction of the other, obviating both . The lesbian is identitarian, a neatly wrapped argument 
we’re already familiar with, and which we can easily shelf; the lesbian is an understandable figure, 
there’s no need to understand her. The author’s actual words are effectively erased. The patrician 
playwright can only hear pregnant, pregnant, pregnant, a litany that drives his interest away from 
Nelson’s actual book, her actual words—the question he asks at her talk is about her “condition.” 
Thoughts about cruelty can’t flow from the pregnant woman, the figure of care, so thoughts about 
those thoughts are disregarded. Eve Sedgwick becomes Jane Austen becomes “the masturbating 
girl”: what was galling to her critics, Nelson writes, “was the spectacle of a writer or thinker — be 
it Sedgwick or Austen — who finds her work happy-making, and who celebrates it publicly as 
such” (113). This reduction so neatly conflates the content of Sedgwick’s thoughts with the figure 
of the masturbating girl that the critics need not wait for the thoughts to materialize at all before 
responding to them. Rosalind Krauss’s substantive critiques of its ahistoricity, its mis-use of 
theory, but Nelson hears the “undercurrent” of Krauss’ argument as “maternity had rotted Gallop’s 
mind.” Gallop presents herself complexly: photographic subject, wife, and critic; mother, subject, 
feminist theorist of motherhood. Nelson’s diagnosis of what’s going on in this scene could be 
phrased as her perception that all Krauss really hears is mother, mother, mother.  
Nelson depicts these figures as accruing something to themselves, satisfying their own need 
for what’s alternately described as seriousness, authority, sophistication, rectitude. When she 
introduces the anecdote about Krauss, she writes, “The professors gathered solemnly around a long 
wooden table in one of the more handsome rooms at the Grace Building, where CUNY was then 
situated,” she writes (39). The prize of the exchange between Gallop and Krauss is academic 
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authority. While Nelson describes Gallop as sort of endearingly zany, “droopy-eyed and louche, 
and had that bad but endearing style that so many academics have,” Krauss “was Gallop’s inverse – 
sharp face, classy in a silk scarf, Ivy League, Upper East Side way” (40). Krauss “lashes” Gallop 
for her lack of rigor so she can uphold and assert her own. She acts as though “Gallop should be 
ashamed for trotting out naked pictures of herself and her son in the bathtub, contaminating serious 
academic space with her pudgy body and unresolved, self-involved thinking,” so that Nelson will 
be forced to admit “It’s true that Gallop is no art historian, certainly not in the way that Krauss is” 
(41). Gallop’s thinking must be rotted by motherhood, too soft, so that Krauss can be the real 
scholar, the real thinker. Similarly, Judith Butler’s thinking must be identitarian, “unsophisticated,” 
so that the work of Žižek, Badiou and Baudrillard can be broader minded, transcendent. The excuse 
not to listen to the identitarian serves to let the listener resume his role as speaker. The antagonistic 
reader’s drive for legitimacy is zero-sum: in order for him to speak, she must be silenced. Krauss is 
Gallop’s inverse. The very thing that enraged the right-wing culture warriors about the non-existent 
talk “Jane Austen and the Masturbating Girl” was, Nelson recalls Sedgwick thinking, the specter of 
self-pleasure both literal and literary, which is to say, the image of a woman’s self-containment, a 
refusal of the kind of dialectical relationship by which your incompetence equals my authority – a 
dialectical relationship that, as feminists such as Beauvoir and Catharine MacKinnon have 
theorized, has defined “man.” In Nelson’s reading through Sedgwick’s reading, the culture warriors 
flagellated this image of self-containing and self-sustaining pleasure, to (dialectically) legitimate 
their own ascetic discipline, their own upright usefulness.  
Nelson sees the drives behind antagonistic reading as those that operate political 
subjectivity. They come down to a desire for legitimacy and visibility – twinned concepts in 
Nelson’s theorizing about gender and sexuality. At the time she met Harry, Nelson writes, opening 
the book,  
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I had spent a lifetime devoted to Wittgenstein’s idea that the inexpressible is contained – 
inexpressibly! – in the expressed. This idea gets less air time than his more reverential 
Whereof one cannot speak thereof one must be silent, but it is, I think, the deeper idea. Its 
paradox is, quite literally, why I write, or how I feel able to keep writing.  
 
For it doesn’t feed or exalt any angst one may feel about the incapacity to express, in words, 
that which eludes them. It doesn’t punish what can be said for what, by definition, it cannot 
be. Nor does it ham it up by miming a constricted throat: Lo, what I would say, were words 
good enough. Words are good enough. (3) 
 
Harry, meanwhile, had, at that point, “spent a lifetime equally devoted to the conviction that words 
are not good enough….Once we name something, you said, we can never see it the same way 
again. All that is unnameable falls away, gets lost, is murdered. You called this the cookie-cutter 
function of our minds” (4). This opening standoff prepares us for Nelson’s reconsideration and 
elaboration of her beliefs about language: “I’ve explained this elsewhere,” she writes about 
Wittgenstein, “But I’m trying to say something different now” (4). Meeting Harry is what causes 
Nelson to confront the problem of visibility anew: Harry’s life is caught in the jaws of visibility’s 
self-defeating currents, best and poignantly explained with a drawing of Harry’s of a ghost, cutely 
captioned, “Without this sheet, I would be invisible” (86). The ghost is unrecognizable to others as 
ghost without the sheet, but the sheet eliminates the invisibility that is the essence of ghost. Harry 
likes the changes the T brings that make his masculinity recognizable and affirmable by the world, 
but, Nelson writes to him, “You also feel them as a sort of compromise, a wager for 
visibility…visibility makes possible, but it also disciplines: disciplines gender, disciplines genre” 
(86). Harry’s desire for his gender to be physically visible diminishes another crucial aspect of his 
internal experience of it, its indeterminacy. This is understanding of gender that Judith Butler 
famously elaborates in Gender Trouble, the opening paragraph of which states:  
On the one hand, representation serves as the operative term within a political process that 
seeks to extend visibility and legitimacy to women as political subjects; on the other hand, 
representation is the normative function of a language which is said either to reveal or to 
distort what is assumed to be true about the category women. For feminist theory, the 
development of a language that fully or adequately represents women has seemed necessary 
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to foster the political visibility of women. (2) 
 
Butler goes on to argue that there is no “natural” essence, woman, that the language seeking to 
“accurately” describe what woman “really is” (as opposed to the degraded and subjected being she 
is now) constitutes her, and is thus always asserting normative and exclusionary force on subjects. 
Language, for Harry and increasingly for Nelson, the act of speaking or writing itself, is a bid for 
this kind of visibility; the kind that legitimates a person as subject within a political and juridical 
system. As Butler writes, visibility has been so necessary for legitimacy that one only becomes 
available to be counted as subject at all when one is visible as one gender or the other (46).  
 The antagonistic readers whose reading makes them sophisticated by making the speaker 
unsophisticated, rigorous by making the speaker soft, disciplined by making the speaker self-
indulgent, are, in Nelson’s view, seeking visibility and legitimacy in an almost existential sense. In 
their zero-sum vision, the speaker’s speech is a bid for visibility that threatens to exclude and 
discipline their own identities, and they must reverse the dynamic in favor of their own visibility 
and legitimacy. Antagonistic reading is a microcosm of Butler’s society-level understanding of 
how power constitutes and disciplines it subjects through gender, an examination of it “from the 
inside” (84). Early in the narrative Nelson recalls a particularly painful incident in her relationship 
with Harry when, just getting to know his three-year-old son, his ex says “Tell your girlfriend to 
find a different kid to play house with” (14). “To align oneself with the real while intimating that 
others are at play, approximate, or in imitation can feel good,” she muses in response to this, and 
“Some people find pleasure in aligning themselves with an identity, as in You make me feel like a 
natural woman,” which is why D.W. Winnicott’s notion of “feeling real,” contrary to a realness 
situated in an identity, a realness that is dialectical and zero-sum, is so moving to her: “One can 
aspire to feel real, one can help others to feel real, and one can oneself feel real – a feeling 
Winnicott describes as the collected, primary sensation of aliveness” (14). These are the 
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dimensions behind bolstering yourself with a destructive reading of another: a primary need for the 
feeling of political, social legitimacy, of realness.  
 As the narrative progresses, we get an escalating sense of the imaginative grip the 
antagonistic readers have on Nelson as she writes into an uncertain readerly landscape tripped with 
discursive landmines. Her examples make it clear why they’re threating to the text, why she can’t 
simply write to others, and ignore them. For one thing, her sense is that antagonistic readers can be 
anyone: it’s not just that right wing culture warriors rip apart queer theorists; keenly intelligent 
women rip apart other keenly intelligent women; left Marxists dismiss left post-structuralists; 
playwrights talk past memoirists. Antagonistic reading is not a dynamic that she sees as only taking 
place across group boundaries (obviously, in large part because her project is to deconstruct group 
boundaries). There is no clear way of distinguishing which set of readers she could address 
“instead” of addressing antagonistic readers – all readers are potentially antagonistic readers, even 
(actually, especially – as I’ll discuss) the queer readership she most wants to address. And 
antagonistic readings, Nelson suggests, are contagious. When she recalls listening to Gallop’s 
lecture, Nelson remembers being “surprised and pleased that she was showing us naked photos of 
her son,” and thinking “I liked that Gallop was onto something and letting us in on it before she 
fully understood it. She was hanging her shit out to dry: a start” (40). She is a captive audience, but 
also one seducible to the lure of Krauss’ self-mastery, prestige, legitimacy. Sitting down in the 
solemn seminar room, she writes, “I felt as though I had truly arrived—somehow I had been 
plucked from the corner booth of Max Fish and deposited at the center of an intellectual mecca, 
complete with dark wood and academic superstars” (39). At the end of the episode she writes that 
she “stood with Gallop,” but there’s something joyless in it (“I felt I had no choice,”), and it’s not 
before she has ceded that Gallop has always been something of a narcissist, that she really isn’t an 
art historian in the way Krauss is. Krauss’ lashing, the authorial Nelson implies, threatened to dim 
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the shine of Gallop’s words in the eyes of other willingly attentive and open readers.  
But the real threat is to Nelson herself. The lashing Rosalind Krauss gives Jane Gallop 
“stood for some time in my mind as an object lesson” (41). Whatever principle she internalized 
from that lesson about how to be and how to write in such and such a space and what will come to 
you if you violate such rules, it preoccupied her and held sway with her long after that day. What 
starts as a warning becomes, by the end of the text, so formless and general a threat that it casts, in 
the form of the man with the attaché case, a mythic and overwhelming dread over the act of 
writing. The examples of possible antagonistic readers accumulated over 120 pages or so seem to 
eliminate the possibility of any right way to be. You can be as philosophical and removed as Judith 
Butler, and still be too personal, just the lesbian; you can draw your thought from a complicated 
and multifaceted image of yourself as mother, wife, critic, feminist and still be seen reductively as 
mother, just soft. Trying to write a talk she was due to give about Eve Sedgwick at CUNY that 
would later become part of this book, she is overcome by paranoid thoughts about the stalker: 
“Other moments of my life may have looked worse, but this one felt like its own kind of bottom: 
I’d never felt so scared and nihilistic at the same time. I wept for the baby and the life I felt sure 
would never be ours, no matter how badly I wanted it” (116). Throughout The Argonauts, 
pregnancy is writing’s metaphorical twin, the two supposedly mutually exclusive creative acts that 
Nelson works to make compatible. The image of a man obsessed with Jane’s murder and obsessed 
with Nelson for writing about Jane’s murder, driving Nelson to sit on her back porch and smoke an 
egg-shriveling cigarette that breaks a two-year fertility regimen while sitting next to a cylinder of 
pepper spray is an image of antagonistic reading at its most obscenely threatening, as too tangible 
in its operation, and yet so diffusely general in its possibility as to not just erase but to pre-
emptively paralyze speech. 
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II. A Feminist Critique of Queer 
To read The Argonauts thinking about how it might be shaped by this collection of figures 
is to read it thinking about the anxieties she’s tamed and the provocations she’s softened or 
submerged. In spite of disavowing any desire to persuade or defend the rightness of any position, 
Nelson does make an argument – a provocative one. And in spite of the looming possibility of 
crushing dread figured by the “horrible thing,” Nelson is able to imagine more specifically what 
kinds of negative reactions and which communities of readers her argument is likely to call up. 
To be initially schematic about a subtle argument: The Argonauts is a feminist critique of 
queer thought and practice from the borders of, and to, the queer community. Early in the 
argument, Nelson sketches the terrain of queer thinking that defines the term queer and its radical 
potential against family. Early in her relationship with Harry, when she drives by Prop 8 signs that 
were springing up on the Los Angeles mountainside (advocating a ballot measure against gay 
marriage in California), she thinks of Catherine Opie’s Self-Portrait/Cutting, an image Opie carved 
into a back after breaking up with her partner of two stick figure women holding hands in front of a 
house and a sun and clouds. Nelson writes, “I don’t get it, I said to Harry. Who wants a version of 
the Prop 8 poster, but with two triangle skirts?” (11). Later, when her friend notices a mug 
Nelson’s mother gave her plastered with a photo of the family, Nelson seven months pregnant, all 
of them dressed up to see the Nutcracker at Christmastime, and says “I’ve never seen anything so 
heteronormative in all my life,” Nelson questions, “But what about it is the essence of 
heternormativity?” Is it the fact that her mother used a boojie photo service, “the presumed 
opposition of queerness and procreation,” the tradition of being photographed during the holidays 
in your holiday best (13)? Nelson agrees with queer thinkers’ critique of the homonormative 
direction of the GLBTQ+ movement. “There’s something truly strange about living in a historical 
moment in which the conservative anxiety and despair about queers bringing down civilization and 
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its institutions (marriage, most notably) is met by the anxiety and despair so many queers feel about 
the failure or incapacity of queerness to bring down civilization and its institutions,” she writes; “if 
we want to do more than claw our way into repressive structures, we have our work cut out for us” 
(26). At the same time, she sees the radical versions of queer living and thinking on offer as 
exclusionary.  
By way of Eve Sedgwick, Nelson offers us two alternate definitions of “queer.” Sedgwick, 
Nelson writes,  
wanted to make way for ‘queer’ to hold all kinds of resistances and fracturings and 
mismatches that have little or nothing to do with sexual orientation. ‘Queer is a continuing 
moment, movement, motive – recurring, eddying, troublant,’ she wrote. ‘Keenly, it is 
relational, and strange.’ She wanted the term to be a perpetual excitement, a kind of 
placeholder – a nominative, like Argo, willing to designate molten or shifting parts, a means 
of asserting while also giving the slip.” (29) 
 
At the same time, Sedgwick “argued that ‘given the historical and contemporary force of the 
prohibitions against every same sex sexual expression, for anyone to disavow those meanings, or to 
displace them from the term [queer]’s definitional center, would be to dematerialize any possibility 
of queerness itself” (29). Nelson describes this dichotomy as Sedgwick wanting to have it both 
ways, a dichotomy and a desire that puts a point on the problem. “Queer,” she thinks, is too 
attached to its definitional center, to its desire for the visibility offered by an identity like 
“homosexuality,” which really means gay, which really means male. In one narrative, she recalls 
feeling what she suspects is an unwarranted annoyance at a bouncer who will not let her bring her 
five-month son into a (presumably gay) burlesque show; she felt, she says, “the specter of what 
Susan Fraiman has described as ‘a heroic gay male sexuality as a stand-in for queerness which 
remains ‘unpolluted by procreative femininity’” (67). She observes, later, that “the tired binary that 
places femininity, reproduction, and normativity on one side and masculinity, sexuality, and queer 
resistance on the other has lately reached a kind of apotheosis, often posing as a last, desperate 
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stand against homo- and heteronormativity, both” (75, italics attributed by Nelson to Susan 
Fraiman).  In response to Lee Edelman’s argument that “queerness names the side of those not 
‘fighting for the children,’ the side outside the consensus by which all politics confirms the 
absolute value of reproductive futurism” and to his invective to Fuck the social order and the Child 
in whose name we’re collectively terrorized, she asks “why bother fucking this Child when we 
could be fucking the specific forces that mobilize and crouch behind its image?” Of Edelman’s 
reading Freud’s Wolf Man case as a coded fantasy of gay male sex, she writes “This interpretation 
has appeal and value. But if the woman’s [the mother’s] genitals have to be willfully erased in 
order to get there, and her pleasure distorted into a cautionary tale re: the perils of castration, we 
have a problem. (Rule of thumb: when something needs to willfully erased in order to get 
somewhere, there is usually a problem)” (69). She is skeptical that the radical potential of 
queerness can be located in “sexual deviance”: “In an age all too happy to collapse the sodomitical 
mother into the MILF, how can rampant, ‘deviant’ sexual activity remain the marker of radicality? 
What sense does it make to align ‘queer’ with ‘sexual deviance,’ when the ostensibly straight world 
is having no trouble keeping pace?” (110).  
Against these attachments and exclusions, she makes a case for seeing women’s 
experiences as disruptive, as “queer.” In response to her friend’s offhanded comment about her 
heteronormative mug, Nelson wonders, “Is there something inherently queer about pregnancy 
itself, insofar as it profoundly alters one’s ‘normal’ state, and occasions a radical intimacy with – 
and radical alienation from – one’s body?” (13). She makes this visible: she writes of the pregnant 
body’s “obscenity,” the public autoeroticism of the intimate relation between fetus and child. And 
then, the eroticism of the intimate relation between baby and child, the political significance and 
the radical transgression of insisting on being mother and person, maternal and erotic, maternal and 
intellectual, and insisting on not just being both at different times but being both, substantively, at 
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once (64, 74, 96, 100). She points out the normativity of the command to be available for sex, and 
tries on the radical potential of abstaining from sex (!): “Faced with the warp speed of this ‘new 
kind of hot, psychotropic, punk capitalism,’ especially from my station of fatigue, exchanging 
horniness for exhaustion grows in allure. Unable to fight my station, at least for the time being, I 
try to learn from it; another self, stripped” (111).  
This is more than just an argument, via “queering” maternity and the aging female body, for 
queer to more fully embrace Sedgwick’s first definition, queerness as flight. It’s an argument 
underlining how difficult it is really for groups and identities to remain open to “all that is flow,” an 
argument that points out that queer’s declaration of being keenly relational and strange has been, at 
times, disingenuous, a self-gratifying posture that allows and masks a “release” back into the 
default commitment to the definitional center. She writes: 
Perhaps it’s the word radical that needs rethinking. But what could we angle ourselves 
toward instead, or in addition? Openness? Is that good enough, strong enough? You’re the 
only one who knows when you’re using things to protect yourself and keep your ego 
together and when you’re opening and letting things fall apart, letting the world come as it 
is—working with it rather than struggling against it. You’re the only one who knows. And 
the thing is, even you don’t always know. (27, italics Pema Chodron) 
 
The answer The Argonauts gives to this self-questioning is yes, we should angle ourselves towards 
openness, but no, it’s not strong enough. At one point she recalls the first day in a graduate seminar 
with Eve Sedgwick, in which Sedgwick asked the students to break the ice by choosing a totem 
animal. Nelson recalls first recoiling at the exercise of labeling at all (“the game placed an icy 
finger on my identity phobia”) and then, when the circle got to her, unexpectedly saying her animal 
was an otter:  
It was important to me back then to feel, to be wily. To feel small, slick, quick, amphibious, 
capable. I didn’t know then Barthes’ book The Neutral, but if I had, it would have been my 
anthem – the Neutral being that which, in the face of dogmatism, the menacing pressure to 
take sides, to offer novel responses: to flee, to escape, to demure, to shift or refuse terms, to 
disengage, to turn away. The otter was thus a complex sort of stand-in, or fake-out, another 
identity I felt sure I could shimmy out of.” (112)  
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In other words, Nelson understands flow and openness as necessary political aims but also as 
seductive, gratifying, even assuaging stances: you’re the only one who knows when you’re using 
things to protect yourself and keep your ego together. Fixed identity can protect and keep your ego 
together; letting the world come as it is can also be used to protect yourself and keep your ego 
together. She does not disavow the need for visibility. She marshal’s feminism’s definitional center 
to expose and disrupt queer’s reliance on its (exclusionary) definitional center.  
Throughout, Nelson shows a wariness that being a woman who can “pass” and whose 
identity is at minimum not quite at the definitional center of queer while making the critique above 
courts the vitriol of potentially antagonistic readers. The readings she knows she courts are 
described by words like presumption, appropriation, privilege. She shows flashes of keen attention 
throughout the narrative to her position in the queer orbit, and to how Harry’s overtly changing 
gender locates her in it. For example, she writes, “Soon after we got together, we attended a dinner 
party at which a (presumably straight, or at least straight-married) woman who’d known Harry for 
some time turned to me and said, ‘so, have you been with other women, before Harry?’ I was taken 
aback. Undeterred, she went on: ‘Straight ladies have always been hot for Harry.’ Was Harry a 
woman? Was I a straight lady?” (8). In another example, Nelson describes going to see an art porn 
movie her friends made, and feeling put off by the movie’s ending dedication “to the queerest of 
the queer”: “The audience applauded, and I applauded too. But inside the dedication felt like a 
needle zigzagging off the record after a great song. Whatever happened to horizontality? Whatever 
happened to the difference is spreading? I tried to hold on to what I liked most about the movie, 
which was watching people hit each other during sex without it seeming violent…” (63). What 
Nelson liked most about the movie was the characters whose sexuality “reminded me of mine in 
ways I couldn’t name but moved me,” to see her own non-normative preferences depicted tenderly 
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– “held and beheld,” to use her words, by queer. That the movie’s dedication to the “queerest of the 
queer” sounds an off-note suggests that she feels cast out by it, that she’s sensitive to the fact that 
she’s not seen as the queerest of the queer. Soon after Harry’s top surgery in Florida, eating dinner 
at a Mexican restaurant, Nelson writes to Harry, “You pass as a guy; I, as pregnant” (83). Unsaid, 
but implied: we pass as normal, or rather, normative. She is much too savvy either to argue or to 
genuinely believe this “passing” is an irrelevant mis-perception of her “true” queerness. When she 
takes off alone on book tour for The Art of Cruelty, “passing” as pregnant, military personnel salute 
her, and she muses: “So this is the seduction of normalcy, I thought as I smiled back, compromised 
and radiant” (90). The way one is seen, the way one is treated, determines as much as reflects one’s 
gender. This passing is compromising.  
Nelson recalls that Sedgwick “took heat” when she tried to practice her own fugitive 
definition of queer as a signifier that could be invoked simply by the desire to use it in the first 
person: “Annoying as it might be to hear a straight white guy talk about a book of his as queer (do 
you have to own everything?), in the end, it’s probably all for the better. Sedgwick, who was long 
married to a man with whom she had, by her own description, mostly postshower, vanilla sex, 
knew about the possibilities of this first-person use of the term perhaps better than anyone else. She 
took heat for it, just as she took heat for identifying with gay men (not to mention as a gay man) 
and for giving lesbians not much more than an occasional nod” (29). She knows the kind of “heat” 
that might produce antagonistic readers from having once dished it out herself: “For all the years I 
didn’t want to be pregnant—the years I spent harshly deriding ‘the breeders’ – I secretly felt 
pregnant women were smug in their complaints. Here they were, sitting on top of the cake of the 
culture, getting all the kudos for doing exactly what women are supposed to do, yet they still feel 
unsupported and discriminated against” (90).  
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III. Making the Brutal Tender 
It is a testament to The Argonauts and its rhetorical and formal dexterity that the following 
description of it seems like a gross misreading: “a cis-woman claims she has some understanding 
of what FTM gender transition is like from her own experience of pregnancy.” Certainly Nelson’s 
associational rather than straightforwardly argumentative mode of writing, her use of analogy 
rather than declarative comparison to make the claim I summarized, her thinking’s ability to 
sympathetically analyze two positions, even to “want it both ways” herself sometimes, have 
something to do with diffusing the potentially explosive assertions of The Argonauts. But the way 
Nelson primarily addresses and manages the readings of potentially antagonistic readers is through 
her address to Harry.      
When Nelson writes about the crescendo of dread occasioned by “the horrible thing,” she 
extends her thinking to a larger consideration of paranoia. Turning away from the paranoid 
thinking she learned from her mother and internalized – her mother’s is the voice in Nelson’s head 
asking about her next writing project “Are you sure that’s a good idea?”,  the voice that risks seeing 
writing only in terms of the horrible thing it might summon – Nelson examines the reparative 
writing practices of some of the ‘many-gendered mothers of her heart.’ The many gendered 
mothers of her heart say: “Just because you have enemies does not mean you have to be paranoid. 
They insist, no matter the evidence marshaled against their insistence: There is nothing you can 
throw at me that I cannot metabolize, no thing impervious to my alchemy” (122-123). This is the 
ethos that carries her up and out of the nihilistic bottom to which her stalker dragged her: “The 
realization that I could incorporate the stalker into my talk about Sedgwick eventually became an 
incitement for me to get back to work. Yes, get back to work. It even became a source of comfort, 
as if bringing such an episode into the orbit of Eve would neutralize its negative force” (123). And 
it is the ethos that describes how The Argonauts is shaped by its confrontation with antagonistic 
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reading: by bringing the dread of it into Harry’s “orbit,” by metabolizing the antagonistic reader 
into the text as the figure of Harry, her original antagonistic reader.  
In the beginning of the book, Nelson’s depiction of “you,” of Harry, is blissful, giddy, 
loving. She is vulnerable, she is desperate to make him love her. As they begin to settle into a life 
as a family with Harry’s son, they’re brought up short by what Nelson calls their “hard season”: 
custody battles, the illness of Harry’s mother, but most of all (for this text’s considerations 
anyway), a peak in Harry’s feeling of imprisonment in his own body. Nelson writes in a minimal 
way about the problems between them during their “hard season,” (probably according to Harry’s 
wishes, as I’ll discuss; in a desperate bid for hope during this time, Nelson searches – shamefully, 
she knows – for evidence that the blissfully in love Mary and George Oppen fought during their 
lifetimes; Harry tells her of course they fought, but they probably kept it private, “out of respect 
and love for one another”), but she makes it clear that her anxiety about Harry’s transition was 
central to them, and that this anxiety worried over how the changes would come to define her in 
relation. During this period Nelson recounts the following conversation: 
I just want you to feel free, I said in anger disguised as compassion, compassion disguised 
as anger. 
Don’t you get it? you yelled back. I will never feel as free as you do, I will never feel as at 
home in the world, I will never feel as at home in my own skin. That’s just the way it is, and 
always will be. 
Well then I feel really sorry for you, I said. 
Or maybe, Fine, but don’t take me down with you. (31) 
 
Nelson’s mis-remembering reads and translates her own final comment (“Well then I feel really 
sorry for you”) as an impulse to draw a line between the two of them, to relinquish and separate 
herself from Harry’s problems with gender (“don’t take me down with you”). In context, the 
comment probably meant something like: don’t let your inability to live in your own skin threaten 
our relationship. But it also shows us that there was a time in their relationship in which Nelson 
saw Harry’s freedom as her comedown and entrapment, Harry’s self-definition as overwriting her 
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own. She casts their relationship as having operated by a logic of zero-sum visibility: they’re 
reading each other antagonistically. Nelson goes on:    
You showed me an essay about butches and femmes that contained the line ‘to be femme is 
to give honor where there has been shame.’ You were trying to tell me something, give me 
information I might need. I don’t think that line is where you meant for me to stick—you 
may not even have noticed it—but there I stuck. I wanted and still want to give you any 
life-sustaining gift I have to offer…But I also felt mixed up: I had never conceived of 
myself as femme; I knew I had a habit of giving too much; I was frightened by the word 
honor. How could I tell you all that and stay inside our bubble, giggling on the red couch?  
 
I told you I wanted to live in a world in which the antidote to shame is not honor, but 
honesty. You said I misunderstood what you meant by honor. We haven’t yet stopped 
trying to explain to each other what these words mean to us; perhaps we ne never will. (32) 
 
Harry’s becoming male shunts Nelson into becoming femme, into becoming more 
traditionally/visibly female. Early in The Argonauts, Nelson gives us a reading of Harry’s film By 
Hook or By Crook, in which Harry and his cowriter, Silas Howard, argue that the issue of being 
called by the “right” pronoun isn’t solve-able by insisting that everyone in the outside world use 
the pronoun that corresponds with one’s innermost feeling, because “Words change depending on 
who speaks them; there is no cure…One must also become alert to the multitude of possible uses, 
possible contexts, the wings with which each word can fly. Like when you whisper, You’re just a 
hole, letting me fill you up. Like when I say husband” (8). Seemingly abusive sexual language is 
loving within the context of their mutually created sexual theater of violence; “husband” isn’t 
normatively imbued with authority when Nelson says it to her butch partner. By their own fluid 
theorizing, as the context changes, which is to say, as Harry’s gender changes, the meaning of the 
word “husband” threatens to change. “Honor” veers into sounding biblical, that which is due to 
authority (as in: honor thy father). Nelson’s fixation on it is an anxiety about her own visibility and 
legitimacy – as queer, as feminist. Her worry that she’ll be forced to become more and more 
normatively “woman” as Harry moves further into “man.” 
 When she recounts finishing a first draft of the manuscript of this book and giving it to 
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Harry, she explicitly casts him as her antagonistic reader: 
I finish a first draft of this book and give it to Harry. He doesn’t have to tell me that he’s 
read it: when I come home from work, I can see the pile of ruffled pages sticking out of his 
knapsack, and I can feel his mood, which one might describe as quiet ire. We agree to go 
out for lunch the next day to talk about it. At lunch he tells me he feels unbeheld – unheld, 
even. I know this is a terrible feeling. We go through the draft page by page, mechanical 
pencils in hand, with him suggesting ways I might facet my representation of him, of us. I 
try to listen, try to focus on his generosity in letting me write about him at all. He is, after 
all, a very private person, who has told me more than once that being with me is like an 
epileptic with a pacemaker being married to a strobe light artist. But nothing can 
substantively quell my inner defense attorney. How can a book be both a free expression 
and a negotiation? Is it not idle to fault a net for having holes?  
 
That’s just an excuse for a crappy net, he might say. But it’s my book, mine! Yes, but the 
details of my life, of our life, don’t belong to you alone. OK, but no mind can take the same 
interest in his neighbor’s me as in his own. The neighbor’s me falls together with all the 
rest of the things in one foreign mass, against which his own me stands out in startling 
relief. A writer’s narcissism. But that’s William James’s description of subjectivity itself, 
not narcissism. Whatever—why can’t you just write something that will bear adequate 
witness to me, to us, to our happiness? Because I do not yet understand the relationship 
between writing and happiness, or writing and holding. 
(46-47) 
 
Harry wants to erase Maggie’s words: pencil in hand, he wants to (it is only fair to qualify, as 
Nelson feels it) to facet the text in accordance with his own needs, likely (he is, after all, a very 
private person) he wants to make actual cuts, to put less of them and less of him on display. 
Nelson’s rational mind can hardly triumph over the “inner defense attorney” who feels these edits 
as painful reductions to the writing, and also to her self: “We used to talk about writing a book 
together…Eventually, however, I realized that just the idea of such a merging was causing me too 
much anxiety. I guess I wasn’t ready to lose sight of my own me yet, as for so long, writing has 
been the only place I have felt it plausible to find it (whatever ‘it’ is)” (47).  
 It is clear by the end of the memoir, however, that Nelson does let him edit her manuscript, 
that it is a true – if unequal – collaboration: Nelson narrates in vivid, subjective detail her 
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experience of the birth of her son Iggy, interwoven with passages written by Harry4 in vivid, 
subjective detail about midwifing his mother into death. This collaboration tries to work through 
the problem of visibility, by showing, if not telling (words are not good enough to tell), how to be 
open well enough and strongly enough. Nelson and Harry rewrite labor and death, two experiences 
we normally think of as things we succumb to or that overtake us (in spite of the fact that the word 
“labor” should be a dead giveaway; “You don’t do labor,” Nelson recalls being counseled several 
times, “Labor does you”), as states that are achieved. In the middle of the book, having reached a 
point where she says to Harry that her fears about his transition had been unwarranted, that she’s 
“no longer sure which of us is more at home in the world, which of us is more free” (an incredibly 
provocative statement about the equivalence of their experiences!) she then seems to shift her 
orientation outward, asking Harry as if in strategic conference: “How to explain, in a culture frantic 
for resolution, that sometimes the shit stays messy?” (53). Messy shit is a shorthand, in other 
words, for being in between, for a transition that is not traveling from one pole to another. Later, 
her literal fear of shitting during labor – “all through my labor, I could not shit at all, as it was 
keenly clear to me that letting go of the shit would mean the total disintegration of my perineum, 
anus, and vagina all at once” – is an allegory of the fear of relinquishing the need to keep your ego 
together, the need to be definable and visible, the need that drives antagonistic reading. There is no 
answer for how to let shit stay messy, without succumbing to total disintegration. What Nelson 
gives us is a feeling of how to do it. 
The task of the cervix is to stay closed, to make an impenetrable wall protecting the fetus, 
for approximately forty weeks of a pregnancy. After that, by means of labor, the wall must 
somehow become an opening. This happens through dilation, which is not a shattering, but 
an extreme thinning (O so thin!) 
 
This feeling has ontological merits, but it is not really a good feeling. It’s easy enough to 
                                                     
4I have chosen to continue to refer to Harry Dodge as Harry, even in these passages where he takes on an authorial role 
(enough of one that I think the transition from character to author/narrator should be marked), because there is no 
autograph in the book that marks him as Harry Dodge. 
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stand on the outside and say, “You just have to let go and let the baby out.” But to let the 
baby out, you have to be willing to go to pieces. (124) 
 
Giving birth involves a kind of imaginative commitment to openness. “I try to commit to the idea 
of letting him out. I still can’t imagine it,” she writes. Disentangling yourself from mutual 
definition feels impossible; it involves negotiation, and a mutual leap of faith into doing that which 
feels impossible/bad: “At the bottom, which one can’t quite know is the bottom, one reckons. I’ve 
heard a lot of women describe this reckoning (it might also be called nine centimeters) at which 
one starts bargaining hard, as if striking a deal to save your conjoined lives. I don’t know how 
we’re going to get out of this, baby, but word is that you’ve got to come out, that I’ve got to let you, 
and we’ve got to do this together, and we’ve got to do it now” (130). It involves letting others 
move you into postures that feel uncomfortable: “They tell me the baby is facing a weird way, I 
have to lie on my left side, with my leg elevated. I don’t want to. They tell me twenty minutes this 
way. I see a collection of hands holding my leg. It hurts. After twenty minutes, he has turned” 
(131). It requires imaginative intellectual trust in others that is predicated on awareness of your 
own incapacity. It is following the course of action that goes against your instincts, without 
understanding why, or how. It an incredibly difficult and uphill relinquishing. So is death, Harry 
writes: “each of the volunteers told me that my job was to let my mom know that it was ok to go” 
(131). Later: “she was in the doorway of all worlds and i was in the doorway too. i forced myself 
not to disturb her, she seemed all at once to know where she was going and how to get there. her 
job. her map. the goal at hand…and then her eyes relaxed and her shoulders relaxed of a piece. and 
i knew she had found her way. dared. summoned up her smarts and courage and wacked a way 
through. i was really astonished. proud of her” (132). 
 Their collaborative conclusion retroactively reveals to the reader the extent to which Nelson 
has “metabolized” the antagonistic reader into the rest of the text. What that means is that she has 
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let Harry represent to her, from the outside, the modes of thinking and the tangible interests she 
imagines the antagonistic readers might bring, and she has already subsumed those modes of 
thinking into the text by submitting to his edits. If the passage in which Nelson cannot quell her 
“inner defense attorney” leaves us in suspense – how did they resolve it? how much does what 
we’re reading now look like the original manuscript? – her revelation of the extent to which Nelson 
has allowed Harry’s incursion into the text retroactively allows us to feel Harry as a pervasive force 
on the text. For example, Nelson offers this potentially provocative – a potentially presumptuous – 
analysis of the changes they’re both undergoing during Harry’s recovery from top surgery in the 
middle of the book: “On the surface, it may have seemed as though your body was becoming more 
and more ‘male,’ mine, more and more ‘female.’ But that’s not how it felt on the inside. On the 
inside, we were two human animals undergoing transformations beside each other, bearing each 
other loose witness. In other words, we were aging” (83). That analysis must tread very, very 
carefully between the generosity of understanding it tries for and a collapsing of difference into 
smug and featureless humanism. Nelson presents this as the view from their inside, but she is the 
speaker for this subjectivity – perhaps (a reader sensitive to such issues will suspect) her 
subjectivity is subsuming Harry’s experience of his transition, perhaps she is recalling how she felt 
during that time as the way they felt during that time, and perhaps that recollection erases however 
Harry felt about it, the “true” inside of gender nonconforming experience? But then it is Harry’s 
own narrative at the end of the text that links death to labor and to transition, that paints death as a 
self-actualization for the subject that is a loss to others (as he reminds Nelson she once did, after 
she rages as the mother of a student who mourns her son’s FTM transition as a death). Did Harry 
write about his mother’s death because Nelson’s manuscript had mused on the parallels of gender 
transformation and aging? Or did Nelson muse on the parallels between gender transformation and 
aging, because Harry introduced a narrative of death as self-actualization? The proprietary origins 
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of this line of thought are lost.  
The rhetorical effects of Nelson’s submission to Harry’s influence reach the reader through 
her choice to address the narrative to Harry as “you.” On the one hand, the specificity of the 
address draws a circle of intimacy around the text. In her article “Second Person Narration in 
Literary and Conversational Storytelling,” Jarmila Mildorf discusses reasons why people might, 
despite the usual unnaturalness of using “you” for oral storytelling (“why tell someone his or her 
[own] life story?”), tell stories conversationally in the second person. She analyzes one such 
example, a recording from StoryCorps in which a father and a son are narrating the time in their 
lives when the father decided to remarry after the mother/wife’s death – a time they both lived 
through and remember. The father and son prompt each other with introductions like “You called 
me up, I think it was a Sunday, and you said, ‘I have to tell you something…’” (86). Mildorf writes 
that this form of second-person dialogue “serves not only the purpose of “interactional 
remembering” (Norrick 2005) but also the ‘performance of interactional remembering,’ helping 
speakers create not only a ‘performance of self’ (Thornborrow and Coates 2005: 13) but in fact a 
‘performance of you and I’” (90). Nelson’s “you” sounds like this: her use of it cleaves closely to 
her narration of remembered events in their life together, as if she is one half of a dialogue in which 
they’re reconciling their memories of the same events in front of an audience. The memories that 
are exclusively her own – such as her recollections of the seminar at the Graduate Center – are not 
addressed to “you.” “You” rhetorically signals from the beginning what the text fully reveals in its 
climax – that this is an “interactional” remembering. It is a collaboration, and it thus travels under 
Harry’s authority. This redounds the accusation on the tip of the imagined antagonistic reader’s 
tongue – presumption – back onto the antagonistic reader: however The Argonauts influences or 
distorts their visibility, it impacts Harry’s more, and he has approved it, even has some ownership 
of it (so who are you to take issue with it?). The specificity of the “you” makes one particular 
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reader’s stakes in the text concrete, and primary; the stakes that mobilize the antagonistic reader are 
inevitably secondary and comparatively diffuse. Their claim on the text lacks merit.  
At the same time, Nelson’s you obliquely encompasses the reader in its scope. In an 
overview she gives of a special issue of Style dedicated to exploring the second person, Mildorf 
neatly summarizes a contribution by David Herman: 
David Herman’s contribution to the special issue of Style. Herman (1994) discusses 
what he terms “double deixis”—instances of you where there is “neither complete 
concord nor complete discord between grammatical form and deictic functioning, 
but rather a merely partial (dis)agreement between the form and functions of you” 
(392). Doubly deictic you makes it difficult for readers to decide whether the 
pronoun is to be interpreted as generalized or generic you, as the protagonist’s self-
address, as the text’s internal address to some narratee, or as an external address to 
the reader—or, in fact, as a combination of some or all of these possibilities at the 
same time. (78) 
 
There are few occasions for literal grammatical confusion about when Nelson’s you addresses 
Harry and when it refers more broadly, i.e., when it means “one.” But the context that produces 
Nelson’s "you’s" referentiality is always only partly described: she attributes memories and 
thoughts to the “you” that only Harry, a specific person, can really have held, but the text also does 
not construct this “you” as participating in a true dialogue. Harry never addresses her as “you” 
back, the way the speaking parties do in Mildorf’s exploration of conversational second person. 
The context surrounding Nelson’s use of the specific second person is that it is used in a published 
book that addresses unknown readers; there is no implicit context provided by its genre (like the 
use of letter in Between the World and Me) that imaginatively rationalizes this second-person as 
exclusive and private. The you thus joins in its referentiality you the reader, and Harry, one reader. 
In his posture as antagonistic reader, Harry’s concerns thus carry “your” concerns. Nelson diffuses 
the anticipated threats of the antagonistic reader by giving the sense that their grievances have been 
aired; her submission to Harry’s edits is a kind of performative submission to the antagonistic 
reader, pre-empting their reaction by having already reacted to it. She rhetorically takes the wind 
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out of their sails. 
 The effects of this metabolic “you” aren’t just aimed at the imagined antagonistic reader, 
though. They are also for Nelson herself, to use imaginatively as she is writing, to neutralize the 
paralyzing anticipation of calling up “the horrible thing.” Her “you” is both rhetorical and 
psychological tool. Surveying a lifetime of anxiety, she recalls to the reader being a child and 
attempting to write “prophylactically” against her own fears, by imagining them in vivid and gory 
detail. She remembers being proud of a story that detailed the gruesome kidnap of her and her best 
friend – “Now Jeanne and I would never be kidnapped and tortured without having foreseen it!” – 
for a brief moment before her mother and teachers’ concern about its morbidity made it clear to her 
it wasn’t worthy as art or protection (119). In contrast to that prophylactic praxis, Nelson 
remembers to Harry: 
In the wake of the Patriot Act, during the second administration of George W, you made a 
series of small, handheld weapons. The rule was that each weapon had to be assembled 
from household items within minutes. You’d been gay-bashed before, two black eyes while 
waiting in line for a burrito (you ran after him, of course). Now you thought, if the 
government comes for its citizens, we should be prepared, even if our weapons are pathetic. 
Your art-weapons included a steak knife affixed to a bottle of ranch dressing and mounted 
on an axe handle. A dirty sock sprouting nails, a wooden stump with a clump of urethane 
resin stuck to one end with dull bolts protruding from it, and more.  
 
One night during our courtship, I came home to find the stump with bolts lying across the 
welcome mat of my porch. You had left town, and I had been baffled by your departure. 
But when I ascended my front steps and saw the weapon, shadowy in the twilight, I knew 
you loved me. It was a talisman of protection—a means of keeping myself safe while you 
were gone, a tool to fight off the suitors (had there been any). I’ve kept it by my bedside 
ever since. Not because I think they’re coming for us per se. But because it makes the brutal 
tender, which I’ve since learned is one of your principal gifts. (118) 
 
Bringing the text into Harry’s orbit means learning and working by the lights of a new prophylactic 
praxis. The old one was mimetic of the future it feared. The new one absorbs, processes, returns 
something different. To pile on the trite idioms, Harry’s praxis commands, face your fears: what is 
threatening is the threat of erasure, so Nelson addresses that threat by submitting to erasure — but 
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it is a controlled submission, and a partial erasure. It is a submission with a safe word, a way of 
making the brutal experience of antagonistic reading tender. It is an arming of the mind against the 
psychological threat of animosity that doesn’t just allow for the art to go on, around of or in spite of 
the circumstance of the horrible thing; it is an arming of the mind that makes the action of 
absorbing and processing the threat the art itself – a miniature metaphoric model for the way 
Nelson has absorbed the antagonistic reader in such a way as to produce the unique forms of The 
Argonauts.  
  
Ta-Nehisi Coates’s Between the World and Me: Provocation 
I. Antagonistic Reading as Signifying Trap 
Watching and listening to interviews with Ta-Nehisi Coates – and since the success of 
Between the World and Me, there have been many – I sometimes think Between the World and Me 
is less a memoir than presciently engineered performance art. Prominent interviewers, almost 
always white, or in Coates’s terms, interviewers who need to believe they are white, cannot resist 
asking Coates if he sees any hope for racial relations in America. Here’s a transcription of a recent, 
symptomatic exchange between with Stephen Colbert on The Late Show that clocks the pattern and 
then, almost surreally, indulges in it: 
Colbert: You’ve had a hard time in some interviews expressing a sense of hope that things 
will get better in this country. Do you have any hope tonight for the people out there about 
how we could be a better country, we could have better race relations, better politics? 
Coates: Um, No. But I’m not the person you should go to for that. You should go to your 
pastor, your pastor provides you hope, your friends provide you hope. There are figures that 
exist – in better times, the president of the United States provides you hope. There are 
people who have that kind of moral place in the world, that’s not my job, that’s somebody 
else’s job -- 
Colbert: But I’m not asking you to make [shit] up, I’m asking you if you personally see 
any chance for change in America – 
Coates: Maybe, maybe – 
Colbert: We’re a democracy – 
Coates: I would have to make [shit] up to answer that in a satisfying way. (The Late Show 
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with Stephen Colbert)5 
 
Every time an interviewer asks Coates about “hope” they – unknowingly? – attest to the problem 
Between the World and Me addresses itself to – which is, in a phrase, white ignorance. Every time 
a white interviewer asks Coates if he sees hope for racial progress in America, or asks him about 
his “famous” pessimism, they declare either that they haven’t read the book, or that their need for 
hope is so great that they have ignored what the book actually says. These come to the same thing. 
To read Between the World and Me with attention and watch these interviews fumble again and 
again is to stop listening to the white conversation about the need for hope and to start suspiciously 
asking why it is that they so urgently need “hope.” 
 The reason it’s so galling to me to watch these interviews is that Coates makes it clear that 
to ask about “hope” constitutes a misreading of him within the first six pages of Between the World 
and Me. He makes it clear by explicitly stating it. The book begins: 
 Son, 
 Last Sunday the host of a popular news show asked me what it meant to lose my 
body. The host was broadcasting from Washington, D.C., and I was seated in a remote 
studio on the far west side of Manhattan. A satellite closed the miles between us, but no 
machinery could close the gap between her world and the world for which I had been 
summoned to speak. When the host asked me about my body, her face faded from the 
screen, and was replaced by a scroll of words, written by me earlier that week. 
The host read these words for the audience, and when she finished she turned to the 
subject of my body, although she did not mention it specifically. But by now I am 
accustomed to intelligent people asking about the condition of my body without realizing 
the nature of their request. Specifically, the host wished to know why I felt that white 
America’s progress, or rather the progress of those Americans who believe that they are 
white, was built on looting and violence. Hearing this, I felt an old and indistinct sadness 
well up in me. The answer to this question is the record of the believers themselves. The 
answer is American history.  
  There is nothing extreme in this statement. (5 – 6) 
 
 After this introductory recollection of the interviewer’s question, he pivots away from her, 
opening out into the textual present tense to answer why it is he thinks American progress was built 
                                                     
5The interview aired on cable, I’ve filled in the bleeped expletives.  
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on looting and violence. White Americans, he says, can’t see the blatant and available facts of their 
own history for what it is (and here, I must confess myself white)6: they have only a “dim 
awareness” that they have transgressed against democracy, which Coates calls their God, because 
they’ve constructed their understanding of democracy such that “people” in “government of the 
people” has never designated black people. They see this exclusion as having been in some way 
inevitable: they see racism as the “natural” effect of the “natural” feature of the world, race. In 
reality, Coates writes, race is the child of racism, and black oppression was and is for the 
construction of whiteness. Coates explains these assertions, which summarize the broader 
assertions of the book, in such a way that they describe an answer he might have given the 
interviewer at the time – but the assertions are not that answer. They are a new dialogue, in the here 
and now, directed to Coates’s son. Returning to the interviewer at the end of this opening salvo, he 
writes: 
That Sunday, with that host, on that news show, I tried to explain this as best I could with 
the time allotted. But at the end of the segment, the host flashed a widely shared picture of 
an eleven-year-old black boy tearfully hugging a white police officer. Then she asked me 
about “hope.” And I knew then that I had failed. And I remembered that I had expected to 
fail. And I wondered again at the indistinct sadness welling up in me. Why exactly was I 
sad? (10) 
 
Coates’s introductory framing is a kind of coda for reading: the interviewer’s bad reading is 
replaced by Coates’s address to Samori, the good reader, who he tells to “never look away,” never 
let “our” phrasing obscure the physical, real dimensions of meaning. By negative implication, the 
“reading” represented by the interviewer’s follow up question is an obfuscation, a flight, a way of 
                                                     
6And risk a fumble of my own: do I remove myself, as critic, from “whiteness” by using the third person? I “am” 
white, but I do not believe myself white, insofar as I agree with Coates on racial deconstruction and insofar as that 
belief is allowed to be conscious. Because my reading of Coates is that his construction “people who believe they are 
white” purposely leaves a gap for white people to recognize their causal agency in their construction of themselves as 
white, and doing so is a practice of good as opposed to antagonistic reading, I will refer to white people in the third 
person, as if I’m not one of them, while acknowledging that Coates’s deconstruction of race also doesn’t ratify the idea 
that individuals can choose to duck out of whiteness. I think Between the World and Me is agnostic on these politics of 
personal exoneration, as it would call them. Actually, as I will argue, constructing the conditions of this footnote’s 
confusion and then leaving the reader to figure it out alone is sort of the point. 
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obviating his answer. In this anecdote about the interviewer, Coates reads the interviewer as an 
antagonistic reader, and in the same breath, gestures his book’s approach to this reader – a turn 
away from the reader to Samori, which constitutes a refusal to engage an antagonistic reading he 
sees as a trap, the opening invitation into a dynamic by which readers/listeners force 
speakers/writers to signify against themselves.    
 Coates calls this exchange with the interviewer his own failure of communication, figuring 
the interviewer’s ignorance as a sleep from which he could not wake her; but the details of his 
narration make it clear that the interviewer stands for a failure of listening. When the host asks her 
question about “hope,” she introduces it, wordlessly, in Coates’s account, with a photograph of an 
eleven-year-old black boy tearfully hugging a white police officer. This image provides the 
complementary key to understanding how asking about “hope” is not really an interrogative 
question but an antagonistic reading. Coates has just explained that that “the police departments of 
your country have been endowed with the authority to destroy your [black] body” (9). The 
overwhelming number of police murders of black people is not a pattern but a principle; what 
happened to Eric Garner and Tamir Rice is not a possible threat to some black boys but a present-
tense assault on all black individuals, now. The photograph half-heartedly suggests in response to 
this that not all black boys are threatened by police, or, not all police have it out for black boys, or, 
not all black people share your vision of relations with the police. It qualifies the meaning of 
“hope” in the question it’s paired: what the interviewer asks about is not a forward-looking stance 
towards future outcomes – the interviewer does not ask Coates, as a journalist researched in the 
matter, about how effective a policy of reparations would be for ameliorating income disparities 
and segregation, for example – but a question about how bad the present picture is, really. Hope 
becomes “hope” because the interviewer asks, “things aren’t really as bad as you say, are they?” 
rather than “things can change, can’t they?” In other words, if the host is “asking [him] to awaken 
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her from the most gorgeous dream” (whiteness), she also asks him to return her to it. In his 
description of it, it’s an odd ritual: he is “summoned to speak” for the world beyond The Dream, 
the world black Americans experience, only to be immediately asked to contradict what he has just 
been summoned to say. If the flashed photograph represents the network’s muted desire to argue 
back, the interviewer asking instead about “hope” testifies to an unwillingness to do so, it suggests 
a need for Coates himself to provide the alleviation, the contradiction, the negation to his own 
argument.  
 This need for Coates himself to contradict his words, the belief that that contradiction has 
power that the white interviewer’s contradiction would not have, is an attempt to erase his words 
by making him into a “holograph bearing his name.” To believe implicitly in his having such 
power reads him as speaking for all black people, rather than just describing an objectively 
observable experience about black people to which he is as much a witness as anyone else. He is 
incarnated as the black voice, the expert on “race relations.” Like Nelson, Coates sees this 
reduction and conflation as motivated by the interviewer’s own need – here, the need for 
absolution. 
 I call it absolution because I think Coates’s text implies that psychologically, that word best 
characterizes what antagonistic readers need: Americans deify democracy, and understand their 
former racism as having “stood in defiance of their God.” Absolution is the forgiveness of sin from 
a higher authority, and the white antagonistic readers in his examples do desire to be remitted from 
charges by a higher authority: the race prophet who speaks for all black people, or by virtue of the 
nature of things and the inevitability of any other outcome or course of action. But the irony is that 
desiring forgiveness for sin implies that one has acknowledged sin. Coates’s sense of how 
antagonistic reading operates is that it attempts to evoke absolution by shifting the causal narrative 
so that the speaker can’t be said to have caused the sin he’s being absolved for. To desire Coates to 
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contradict his own words suggests that the interviewer sees the problem as Coates seeing the 
problem: the problem is not racially disparate outcomes but black people’s belief that there are 
racially disparate outcomes. Only by the lights of the belief that he is the problem, that his speaking 
is the problem, does it make sense, without arguing against or cross-examining, to invite him to 
revoke what he just said.7 
 We see this operative logic at work again in a second example of the antagonistic reader. In 
Part II, the part of the book that narrates Coates’s life after he has grown up and achieved the 
“velocity of escape” from the streets of Baltimore, where racism is brought to its most tangible 
point, he recalls to Samori a moment from Samori’s early childhood that is a kind of lesson about 
how black people can always be snatched “back” into the vise of the streets, into that visceral 
racism:   
Perhaps you remember that time we went to see Howl’s Moving Castle on the Upper West 
Side. You were almost five years old. The theater was crowded, and when we came out we 
rode a set of escalators down to the ground floor. As we came off, you were moving at the 
dawdling speed of a small child. A white woman pushed you and said, ‘Come on!’ Many 
things now happened at once. There was the reaction of any parent when a stranger lays a 
hand on the body of his or her child. And there was my own insecurity in my ability to 
protect your black body…someone had invoked their right over the body of my son. I 
turned and spoke to this woman, and my words were hot with all of the moment and all of 
my history. She shrunk back, shocked. A white man standing nearby spoke up in her 
defense. I experienced this as his attempt to rescue the damsel from the beast. He had made 
no such attempt on behalf of my son. And he was now supported by other white people in 
the assembling crowd. The man came closer. He grew louder. I pushed him away. He said, 
“I could have you arrested!” I did not care. I told him this, and the desire to do much more 
was hot in my throat. The desire was only controllable because I remembered someone 
standing off to the side there, bearing witness to more fury than he had ever seen from 
                                                     
7Several reviewers have noted these same dynamics operating in Coates’s real reception after Between the World and 
Me was published. Constance Grady’s article in Vox, “Colbert asked Ta-Nehisi Coates if he has hope for America. 
Coates said no,” traces the trend of white interviewers asking about hope and the implicit suggestion in their question 
that “it is Ta-Nehisi Coates’s job to teach us all there is to know about racism in America. And once he’s finished, we 
would also like for him to make us feel better, to absolve us of our guilt.” Jamelle Bouie’s Slate article, “We Made Ta-
Nehisi Coates Into a Symbol,” characterizes white reception of Coates as making him into Race Prophet, an 
observation I read Coates making as well in this opening episode. In the Washington Post, Carlos Lozada implies in 
“The Radical Chic of Ta-Nehisi Coates” that white readers enjoy reading Coates precisely because they see it as 
completing a responsibility to absorb “the best and correct thinking on racism, white privilege and structural 





The white woman “reads” Coates’s words, hot with the moment, and visibly begins to reduce him 
to a two-dimensional figure of The Violent Black Man, shrinking back with a surprise that, 
Coates’s account suggests, she doesn’t really come by honestly, since she was the one who first 
laid hands and overstepped boundaries. Her shock reflects, and then projects to the other white 
people, her sense of the “disproportion” of the volatile black man’s anger. The white man steps in 
to defend the white woman, an action Coates reads as his attempt to “rescu[e] the damsel from the 
beast.”  
 Here, too, the antagonistic “reading” of Coates – his words but also his gestures, 
expressions, his body – turns on the readers’ need for racial absolution. Coates writes that he has 
retold the story many times in search of his own absolution – not absolution from the offended 
white people or on behalf of the offended white people, but absolution from or on behalf of Samori, 
for “in seeking to defend you I was, in fact, endangering you” (95). In other words, he is adamant 
about refusing to indulge culpability for the interaction. He does not tell us what words he said that 
were hot with the moment, he does not allow us to analyze by our own lights whether he 
“overreacted,” because to do so buys into the logic of the antagonistic reading: that logic dictates 
that no matter how large or small the mistake, it will always be made to “explain” crimes of a 
heinous magnitude: 
 ‘I could have you arrested,’ he said. Which is to say, ‘One of your son’s earliest 
memories will be watching the men who sodomized Abner Louima and choked Anthony 
Baez cuff, club, tase, and break you.’ I had forgotten the rules, an error as dangerous on the 
Upper West Side of Manhattan as on the Westside of Baltimore. One must be without error 
out here. Walk in single file. Work quietly. Pack an extra number 2 pencil. Make no 
mistakes. 
But you are human and you will make mistakes. You will misjudge. You will yell. 
You will drink too much. You will hang out with people you shouldn’t. Not all of us can 
always be Jackie Robinson—not even Jackie Robinson was always Jackie Robinson. But 
the price of error is higher for you than your countrymen, and so that America might justify 
itself, the story of a black body’s destruction must always begin with his or her error, real or 
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imagined – with Eric Garner’s anger, with Travyon Martin’s mythical words (“You are 
gonna die tonight”), with Sean Bell’s mistake of running with the wrong crowd, with me 
standing too closet to the small-eyed boy pulling out. (95 – 96) 
 
Just as The Racial Expert in some way is the problem he describes in the eyes of the white 
interviewer (and all those whose views she represents with her questions) and, by virtue of the 
belief that his verbal revocation can solve the problem, sees his words as the cause of it, The 
Violent Black Man carries an excess of causality: his incarnation as the beast casts the white 
woman as the figure of innocence, the damsel, and the white man as the champion of innocence, 
the righteous warrior – evacuating them of any inciting agency. It allows for the white listeners’ 
amnesia or deafness about the fact that, basically, the white woman started it (pushing a four-year-
old!), and pre-emptively absolves the white man of the control he attempts to exert when he says “I 
could have you arrested!”, a statement that, without the presumption that The Violent Black Man’s 
rage is always already initiating all of the unfolding actions, looks like the attempt to exercise 
arbitrary, interfering, and naked racial power. 
 Like Nelson, part of Coates’s understanding of the threat antagonistic reading poses to a 
text and to the writer/speaker it is conflated with is that it’s a catching phenomenon: the white 
woman’s shock signals the white man’s reading of Coates as beast, and the man draws in a crowd 
of supportive white people – all of whom buy into the reductive (and ready-made) narrative 
projected by the original interlocutors. And the contagion of the antagonistic reading is not limited 
to other (white) “readers” of Coates’s words; the greatest threat is that he will catch the reading 
himself. Nelson presents an image of herself so cowed by the formless dread of “the horrible thing” 
that writing can call up, the world’s blind hatred, that she is paralyzed and silenced. Coates presents 
an image of himself beginning to inhabit and embody the reading to which the white onlookers 
seek to reduce him, or, to be unable to entirely avoid seeing himself as doing so. As the dialogue 
escalates, the man gets closer, Coates gets more and more violent, more and more reckless – he 
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pushes him away, he doesn’t heed the man’s threats to “have him arrested,” he wants to “do much 
more” than tell him off. When he returns home, he’s shaken, in part out of “shame for having gone 
back to the law of the streets,” in other words, for acting the role of “ghetto” black man the white 
Upper West Side onlookers clearly think he is (94). Antagonistic reading is a kind of trap: it invites 
you into its listening-speaking dynamic, invites you to behave in such a way as to fulfill its 
distorted and thus distorting expectations. It is “as natural as Prometheus hating the birds” to get 
angry sensing another person reacting to you as ‘beast,’ but the anger that reader’s framework 
naturally produces will only be legible to them within that interpretive framework (36). It will only 
be legible as “justification” for “having you arrested.” Thus these interpersonal antagonistic 
readings are an instance of and a synechdoche for the operation of contemporary American racism 
writ large. “The killing fields of Chicago, of Baltimore, of Detroit, were created by the policy of 
Dreamers, but their weight, their shame, rests solely upon those who are dying in them. There is a 
great deception in this. To yell ‘black-on-black crime’ is to shoot a man and then shame him for 
bleeding,” he writes (111). He reads contemporary racism as also being a discursive, psychological 
trap: it creates circumstances in which it would be natural for people to behave in such a way as to 
confirm the reductive “readings” of them that justified the creation of the circumstances in the first 
place. Then it disorders this cycle.  
 Because of Coates’s deconstructive thinking about race, antagonistic readers are not 
synonymous with white readers. But in the mind’s eye of this text they are readers whose 
interpretive practices follow the logic of whiteness. Antagonistic reading – the conflation of black 
speakers and their words into a trope such that they – their conflated person/speech – are always 
made to signify white self-justification – is whiteness. It is the discursive incarnation of racism. 
Which is racism. It’s common among his reviewers to notice that Coates locates racism in the 
body, and easy to read his arguments about the body about it as an attempt to locate all the meaning 
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and evidence of injustice in materiality. I don’t take him to be saying that. It’s not that all of “our” 
phrasing, “race relations, racial chasm, racial justice, racial profiling, white privilege, even white 
supremacy,” is irrelevant, because racism is “really” a visceral experience; it’s that it’s all the more 
important to understand, carefully, how the discourse operates, because all of that discourse, “the 
sociology, the history, the economics, the graphs, the charts, the regressions all land, with great 
violence, upon the body” (10). Words and actions are like matter and energy, one always 
potentially the other. Words hurt, actions signify. These are the stakes in theorizing and confronting 
antagonistic reading. 
  
II. White Readers and Performative Refusal 
Although Coates said in interviews after the publication of Between the World and Me that 
he expected his book to be of interest mainly to black people, and that he didn’t expect to 
accumulate the number of white readers he allegedly did, some of the most negative responses he 
received came from prominent black academics. Their critique of the book stemmed from its 
popularity with white readers.8 In a conversation with Kevin Powell at The New School about 
Black Masculinity in October 2015, hooks said conversationally:  
Think about how white people are so enamored with Ta-Nehisi Coates’s book, but you 
won’t find anything in his book about gender, about teaching his son to see women 
differently. It’s all about this whole idea that – and everybody’s so happy, the black man is 
speaking to his son, the black man is reaching out to his son. And you know, that’s just 
another kind of bullshit. This book is very much written in Atlantic Monthly and New 
Yorker-speak, and I don’t know what young black men it’s reaching out to, but it’s reaching 
out to a mythic, fictive black male, not the reality of young black men, for whom a certain 
kind of language isn’t going to draw them in. I mean I think you have to be true to who you 
                                                     
8 I should say, its alleged popularity with white readers. Between the World and Me did receive several glowing 
reviews from white readers, though it also received glowing reviews from black readers, including the ubiquitous 
praise from Toni Morrison that graces the book’s front and back covers. Sales numbers are notoriously difficult to 
track accurately. Critics who claim Coates’s book is popular with white readers may be operating under the assumption 
that it is impossible for a book to make it to #1 on the New York Times Bestseller List without an unusual amount of 
white readers for a book written by a black author, but they’re eyeballing it at best (as well as speaking relatively: 
Coates’s book might not be more popular with white readers than other books written by white authors). Sales figures 
are not broken down by racial demographic. 
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say your audience is! Is it a letter to your son because you want him to understand, and 
other black boys to understand, or is it a letter to white people so that you can let them 
know, you’re not like those other trifling Negroes that don’t have shit to say to their sons? 
(Jobs) 
 
There’s an anxiety in this critique about what happens when a book is for white readers, which 
seems to acknowledge Bakhtin’s sense that any kind of speech is influenced by its intended or 
imagined interlocutor and responder. hooks reads the book as being for white people because she 
reads gesture of addressing the book to Samori as showy (or, vice versa). More than an empty 
rhetorical decoration on a book that ‘really’ addresses upper middle class, educated white readers, 
she sees Coates’s address to his son as deceptive. And not just deceptive, a ploy to make white 
readers believe they’re reading “authentically black” discourse, but pandering: a ploy justify 
himself as the responsible father in accordance with white society’s wish to discipline the “out of 
control” behavior of black boys. 
 I agree with hooks that Coates’s address to Samori is showy. I also agree with hooks that 
Between the World and Me addresses itself to white readers. But her critique rests on the 
assumption that showiness is synonymous with insincerity, that insincerity is synonymous with 
deception, and that the motive for deception is to curry favor. It seems to operate on the assumption 
that being for white readers means the book isn’t really for black readers, that it can only address 
one of those groups at a time, or only address one of those groups authentically at a time.  
None of these conclusions follow. Coates’s address to Samori is showy, but it is also 
sincere. Between the World and Me does address white readers, but it also addresses black readers, 
and it does so at the same time.9 With respect to white readers, Coates’s address to Samori is 
                                                     
9I only discuss Coates’s imaginative angling towards black readers and white readers because this is the critical axis 
along which he distinguishes different modes of reading. While he acknowledges other kinds of difference, including 
gender, sexuality, and other racial oppressions, these subjectivities are not hailed by the text as readers. I do not mean 
to say that he does not imagine that women will read this book, but he does not address himself to “woman” or 
“Muslim-American” as a mode of reading or as specifically likely figures of potential antagonistic reading. 
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performed: he firmly, visibly, and self-consciously directs his address to Samori in order to situate 
the white reader as a voyeur of a conversation about himself. This is performative rather than 
naturalistic: the trope is not meant to convince the reader that as he was writing, Coates held only 
Samori in his mind as the sole reader, that this book is some kind of artifact he decided to publish 
after the fact, or even that he held only young black men in his mind as readers. Addressing Samori 
refuses white readers as the central addressee by declaring the intention to refuse them. It’s as if 
Coates is standing in a room full of people, speaking at audibly to Samori, knowing other people at 
the party are listening to him talk, perhaps even hovering near, waiting to cut in on the 
conversation; he knows they can hear what he is saying, even tailors much of what he is saying 
knowing that they’re listening, and yet, he continues to keep his back turned to the lingerers 
holding their plastic cups of wine looking for an entry point. The dynamics of that scene aren’t 
reducible to the evaluation that he’s really talking to the hovering white listeners: it matters that he 
decides to keep his back turned, even if they know that he knows they can hear him. The effect of 
Coates’s refusal is to create a vacuum for the anticipated needs of the antagonistic readers: their 
anger, the uncomfortable guilt that prods their need for “hope,” are outside the dialogue he’s 
conducting. He withholds the acknowledgment and recognition that would allow that anger to be 
seamlessly directed back at him. Coates’s refusal of the white reader situates them with respect to 
the speaker in such a way as to force antagonistic readers to recognize, in their impulse to respond, 
themselves as instigators, as the ones who bring anger to the text, as the causal agents of an 
antagonistic dynamic that is ultimately rigged to justify its own bad reading. Between the World 
and Me performatively refuses white readers to construct them as instigators of an antagonistic 
dynamic that it is also sincerely showing young black men how to refuse. 
 In order to refuse white readers, he needs to provoke them. Between the World and Me is 
written in a totalizing language that speaks as though it is delivering an indictment to white readers; 
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“as though,” because it indicts them askance, forgoing one defining element of indictment – 
bringing the charges to the accused. Coates’s language is provocative in the sense that it addresses 
itself to the white reader’s usual modes of cognitive flight; it boxes her in, forces her not turn away. 
The white reader’s ability to look away, to dismiss the charges, is sustained, Coates’s language 
asserts, by what they think of as nuance. He shows us this in the interviewer’s first question about 
“hope”: presented with an overwhelming pattern of police killing innocent black people – Eric 
Garner, Renisha McBride, John Crawford, Tamir Rice, Marlene Pinnock— her response is to 
immediately recourse to a photograph that “complicates the picture.” And that “more complicated” 
picture is the occasion of an antagonistic reading that slides seamlessly from “more complicated” 
to “not as bad as you made it seem,” the occasion for the process of reduction, conflation, erasure I 
described above. Coates’s language in the rest of the text is totalizing because the antagonistic 
reader demands evidence of racism that is total; any individual boy who has bonded with the 
police, has an outsize affective power that allows the instance to stand, unintelligibly, “in 
contradiction” with the claim that the police have the authority to destroy black bodies. 
 Coates’s totalizing language is legalistic in its thinking, as if to address the habits of mind 
that have failed to bring charges against the murderers of Tamir Rice, Eric Garner and Michael 
Brown. White readers’ continued erasure of the words that would pierce their ignorance comes, his 
language implies, from seeing nuance in places that weaken their liability; they cannot see racism 
(at all), or rather, they cannot see what Coates would call racism, and which they would deny was 
racism, as culpable action. Criminal law generally conceives of a crime as consisting of actus reus 
and mens rea: a criminal act must have occurred, and the person must be culpable in thought as 
well as action. A person can be culpable in thought across a range of degrees, from engaging in an 
action negligently (a reasonable person would be aware of a “substantial and unjustifiable risk”) to 
purposefully (the actor has the “conscious object” of engaging in conduct and believes or hopes the 
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attendant circumstances – for the completion of his intended result – exist). In order for a criminal 
act to have occurred, it must also be shown that the resulting injury was caused by the accused’s 
action. In order for the accused to be legally liable for the crime, the accused’s action must be 
established as having factually caused and then legally caused the resulting injury. The accused is 
said to have caused the crime factually when his or her action was necessary to the resulting injury 
(the result would not have occurred “but for” the accused’s action); the accused is said to have 
legally caused the injury in question so long as no intervening proximate cause can have 
interrupted the chain of events between his or her illegal action and the result (“Causation (law),” 
“Mens Rea,” “Actus Reus”). 
 Coates tracks the ways of thinking with which his white readers have habitually diminished 
the role of intention in their conception of guilt when the intention was racial domination, or 
habitually exaggerated the importance of intention when the harm to black people was caused by 
the unknowing, negligent actions of people working in concert. This is why the impact of his 
language – David Brooks called it a ‘slap,’ Michiko Kakutani called it “searing,” Tressie McMillan 
Cottom called it “gut-wrenching” – feels so powerful to many readers: at each turn he asserts the 
importance of intention or the unimportance of intention, the obvious gross negligence or the 
absence of proximate causes, wherever he predicts his antagonistic white reader will be inclined to 
see good intentions or complicating proximate causes like personal responsibility as blindingly 
enlarged nuance (Brooks, Kakutani, Cottom).  
 The white reader’s desire to diminish racism by minimizing its causal impact emerges in 
the interviewer’s first question – why does Coates feel that white America’s progress was built on 
looting and violence? This is the question that already calls up an old an indistinct sadness, the 
question that evidences the erasure of earlier words and predicts the interviewer’s antagonistic 
reading of Coates’s answer. That looting and violence occurred in America’s history is obvious; 
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what is clearly controversial to the interviewer is not that slavery happened, or that it included 
looting and violence, but that white America’s progress was built on looting and violence, that the 
progress white America enjoys did not emerge in spite of or incidentally to or triumph over looting 
and violence, but was caused by it. Coates goes on to mock and then ruthlessly deconstruct this 
impotent sense of the looting and violence that allows it to remain isolated in the past:  
As for now, it must be said that the process of washing the disparate tribes white, the 
elevation of the belief in being white, was not achieved through wine tastings and ice cream 
socials, but rather through the pillaging of life, liberty, labor, and land; through the flaying 
of backs; the chaining of limbs; the strangling of dissidents; the destruction of families; the 
rape of mothers; the sale of children; and various other acts meant, first and foremost, to 
deny you and me the right to secure and govern our own bodies. (8) 
 
The language of this argument is provocative in its derisiveness, in its contempt of the naiveté – did 
you think it was all ice cream socials? – white readers will reach for in an attempt to quarantine the 
violence into the past, and reasserts that ‘washing the disparate tribes white’ happened through 
chaining, strangling, pillaging, and rape, that these actions were central to the emergence of unified 
whiteness.  
 White people diminish their liability for racism by impoverishing its causal power, but they 
also diminish their liability by overloading the causality of race, which makes it such a powerful 
and dominating original cause that disparate and negative effects for black people are inevitable: 
Americans believe in the reality of ‘race’ as a defined, indubitable feature of the natural 
world. Racism – the need to ascribe bone-deep features to people and then humiliate, 
reduce, and destroy them—inevitably follows from this inalterable condition. In this way, 
racism is rendered as the innocent daughter of Mother Nature, and one is left to deplore the 
Middle Passage or the Trail of Tears the way one deplores an earthquake, a tornado, or any 
other phenomenon that can be cast as beyond the handiwork of men. (7)  
 
He is swift to reverse the causal order of race/racism to restore the contingency of the results, 
restoring the explanatory gap where white action belongs: “race is the child of racism,” he writes 
(7). He continues to deconstruct the naturalism of race to make room for white agency to be its 
cause throughout the book: “There will surely always be people with straight hair and blue eyes, as 
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there have been for all of history. But some of these straight-haired people with blue eyes have 
been ‘black,’ and this points to the great difference between their world and ours. We did not 
choose our fences. They were imposed on us by Virginia planters…” (42). 
 He is ruthless in dismantling concepts that emerge to siphon away white liability onto 
proximate causes, like “black on black violence.” This is the purpose of statements like “To yell 
‘black-on-black crime’ is to shoot a man and then shame him for bleeding,” which foreshortens 
time to make originating crimes like the mass plunder of slavery and redlining as foreseeable and 
immediate a cause of ghetto violence as a gunshot is to bleeding (111). He forges linguistic 
equivalencies that seem intentionally reductive, even intentionally obfuscating: “there is no 
difference between the killing of Prince Jones and the murders attending these killing fields [the 
streets] because both are rooted in the assumed inhumanity of black people. A legacy of plunder, a 
network of laws and traditions, a heritage, a Dream, murdered Prince Jones as sure as it murders 
black people in North Lawndale with frightening regularity” (110). This is a collapse that I think he 
anticipates will be astonishing for most of liberal white readers: that there is no difference between 
direct murder and the convergence of history, laws and practices that produced a neighborhood like 
North Lawndale. This is a radical reshaping of our usual sense of blameworthiness, even for 
readers better versed in ideas about structural racism: culpability spread across several actors over 
time for murders resulting indefinitely from each individual action decades later is the same as 
culpability seemingly centered in one individual solely deciding, instantly realizing murder, not 
only because the several actors working in concert over time to produce the effects of street murder 
acted more knowingly than we usually conceive – this was the subject of his article “The Case for 
Reparations,” an empirical argument – but because the single actor who murders is not single, all 
white people share in the culpability of the murderer of Prince Jones – this is the subject of 
Between the World and Me, a theoretical argument. 
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 Such radical collapses of time and action confront intentionality, as well as causality. The 
standard common law test of criminal liability states that the act is not culpable unless the mind is 
guilty. This standard subtly shapes all our usual senses of culpability, and white people’s 
perception of good intentions, or of diffuse intentions, or of structures seeming to operate without 
intentions lessens their sense of racism as criminal. Describing an imagined confrontation with the 
white woman who pushed Samori, Coates writes “Had I informed this woman that when she 
pushed my son, she was acting according to a tradition that held black bodies as lesser, her 
response would likely have been, ‘I am not racist.’ Or maybe not. But my experience in this world 
has been that the people who believe themselves to be white are obsessed with the politics of 
personal exoneration” (97). Each individual’s appeal to their own – un-transparent – intentions 
exonerates them all of racism: “there are no racists in America, or at least none that the people who 
need to be white know personally,” Coates writes (97). Because of this Coates goes on to 
repeatedly assert that collective action is intentional; the pillaging, flaying, chaining, strangling, 
raping were acts “meant to deny you and me the right to secure and govern our own bodies” (8). If 
the policies producing the streets do not knowingly murder black people, in the very least they do 
recklessly: “The nakedness is the correct and intended result of policy, the predictable upshot of 
people forced for centuries to live under fear…a society that protects some people through a safety 
net of schools, government-backed home loans, and ancestral wealth but can only protect you with 
the club of criminal justice has either failed at enforcing its good intentions or has succeeded at 
something much darker” (19). In opposition to white peoples’ exonerating appeals to internal 
states, he asserts to Samori that intention is irrelevant: “It does not matter that the ‘intentions’ of 
individual educators were noble. Forget about intentions. What any institution, or its agents, 
‘intend’ for you is secondary. Our world is physical. Learn to play defense – ignore the head and 
keep your eyes on the body” (33). On the other hand, while white people are obsessed with the 
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politics of personal exoneration now, in response to which he accordingly diminishes the 
importance of intention, they have, he writes, a calculated amnesia about culpable intentions in the 
past: recalling a visit to Petersburg Battlefield, he asks Samori if he remembers “the man on our 
tour dressed in the gray wool of the Confederacy, or how every visitor seemed most interested in 
flanking maneuvers, hardtack, smoothbore rifles, grapeshot, and ironclads, but virtually no one was 
interested in what all of this engineering, invention, and design had been marshalled to achieve” 
(99). The myth of the noble South that glued America back together was premised on the erasure of 
the Confederacy’s intention: in recalling the Civil War, Americans are only interested in thinking 
about method, in a narrative that turns “the mass slaughter of the war into a kind of sport in which 
one could conclude that both sides conducted their affairs with courage, honor, and èlan” (102). So, 
in response to such mythologizing, and in total contradiction of his assertion to Samori that 
intentions don’t matter, Coates strenuously locates the meaning of the Civil War entirely in the 
intentions of the south: 
At the onset of the Civil War, our stolen bodies were worth four billion dollars, more than 
all of American industry, all of American railroads, workshops, and factories combined, 
and the prime product rendered by our stolen bodies – cotton – was America’s primary 
export…Here is the motive for the great war. It’s not a secret. But we can do better and find 
the bandit confessing his crime. “Our position is thoroughly identified with the institution 
of slavery,” declared Mississippi as it left the Union, “the greatest material interest of the 
world.” (101) 
 
 The totalizing language of Between the World and Me works towards indictment. It 
conceives of the problem of white ignorance not as a matter of lack of evidence of racism, but as a 
matter of conceptual distortion that allows people not to see the known facts as evidence, because 
they cannot see the actions leading to racism as culpable. The evidence of racism is not evidence to 
them because there are, in their minds, no charges with respect to which the facts prove or 
disprove. Coates strips away the distortions that spackle over the massive gaps in blame; he makes 
plain and explicit the magnitude of the crimes with visceral physicality; then he metaphorically 
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leaves the room, leaving the reader to sit with the absurdity that such disproportionate racial  
“misfortune” happened “naturally.” He does not accuse. Early in the book, he explains that he is 
writing to Samori because this is the year Samori has learned that the police have been endowed 
with the authority to destroy his body; after a litany of crimes that white dominion authorizes, of 
which murder is simply the superlative case, Coates simply writes, “All of this is common to black 
people. And all of this is old for black people. No one is held responsible” (9). “No one is held 
responsible” is the core of his linguistic action. We are left to sit with this lacuna, which explicitly 
refuses to say to white readers, you are responsible. The effect of this refusal is that in order to seek 
absolution through antagonistic reading, to begin obviating and erasing the content of the text’s 
implicit accusation, they need to construct it as one. Defensiveness will be offensiveness; they will 
need to see themselves as causal instigators of the antagonistic dynamic, when erasure of 
themselves as cause, and the overburdening of the black speaker’s causality, is how antagonistic 
reading delivers self-justification. 
 Addressing Samori is the crux of this refusal. Coates’s language fails of accusation because 
it fails to be invested; Samori is the main vessel of his care, where it is held and withheld from 
white readers. When he writes to Samori, for example, “It does not matter that the ‘intentions’ of 
individual educators were noble. Forget about intentions. What any institution, or its agents, 
‘intend’ for you is secondary. Our world is physical. Learn to play defense – ignore the head and 
keep your eyes on the body,” he is in one sense making an argument about culpability, that an 
action’s culpability should be located in its effects, because of the historical level of self-denial 
about racist intentions. But he’s also telling Samori to forget intentions – not because they’re not 
relevant in a moral accounting, but because moral accounting of white actions is really none of his 
concern. It’s not his responsibility to account for events from the white person’s intentional 
perspective; what matters is to attend to his own perspective, where you get killed whether or not 
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the white officer acted purposely. This leaves the nitty gritty of moral accounting to white readers, 
if they wish to account themselves moral. About the question of whether white Americans will 
succeed in creating a “nobler basis for their myths” of democracy, he says, dispassionately, “I 
cannot call it” (7-8). 
 Coates’s language insists that white readers extend themselves to meet him. I agreed with 
hooks that Coates’s address to Samori is showy in the sense that it is more declarative than 
naturalistic; there is very little reference to private events, very little interpersonal shorthand; his 
introduction of anecdotes that include Samori with “perhaps you remember” and “do you 
remember” seem more expository than questioning, as if they’re there to remind the reader of 
Samori’s presence as the intended listener. However, I don’t agree that Coates’s language is not for 
young black men, that it is Atlantic Monthly-speak, implicitly, white-speak. In the first of a four-
part book club written in response to Between the World and Me in The Atlantic, Tressie McMillan 
Cottom writes that she sees the book as being split in two – a book for black readers, and a book 
for white readers for whom “thinking about the necessary ugliness of America is novel” (Cottom). 
She thinks this latter book is strongest when it is anchored by history, and she deplores that she 
thinks white readers cannot “help but look for their own reflection in the gaps Coates provides 
more of than I prefer” (Cottom). In other words, he gives them too much leeway not to be 
convinced, to go on seeing themselves the way the world they “created in their image” has always 
reflected. 
 These gaps are, I think, intentional: at a talk he gave at The Schomburg Center for Research 
in Black Culture, Coates said, “I felt like many of the people that I was reading in the ’90s, when I 
was in college, were very much burdened by the need to explain to white people” (León). 
His thinking about race is deconstructionist and Foucauldian, not the (neo) Liberal of Atlantic-
speak. This language tells a facility with the black intellectual tradition and the theories it draws on; 
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if that is what hooks means by saying this language alienates real black youth, it’s hard to go with 
her there given the image Coates presents of himself as a kid living in Baltimore reading Malcolm 
X like it will save his life. The text does little to help a white reader unfamiliar with these patterns 
of thought through a passage such as his opening response to the interviewer’s question about why 
Coates feels white America’s progress was built on looting and violence: 
“As for now, it must be said that the process of washing the disparate tribes white, the 
elevation of the belief in being white, was not achieved through wine tastings and ice cream 
socials, but rather through the pillaging of life, liberty, labor, and land; through the flaying of 
backs; the chaining of limbs; the strangling of dissidents; the destruction of families; the rape of 
our mothers; the sale of children; and various other acts meant, first and foremost, to deny 
you and me the right to secure and govern our own bodies” (8) 
 
I have bolded the gaps where average white readers, thinking Liberally, would be likely to lose 
Coates. This sentence asks you to understand race as a social construction; many of his (mostly 
college-educated and upper middle class)10 readers likely do have a sense of race as a social 
constructed, although some – the readers of, say, an Andrew Sullivan, former editor of The New 
Republic (a comparable index for readers of The Atlantic and of Coates)11, will struggle to 
understand or otherwise chafe at the idea that race is a “belief,” is not materially genetic.12 It asks 
you to understand not only that race is socially constructed, but that it’s defined dialectically by 
blackness, that the elevation of whiteness demands the ‘essential’ below of blackness (ideas that 
are Hegelian and Beauvoirian, among others). Perhaps most difficult of all for thinkers raised on 
Enlightenment thinking’s individualism and reverence for self-determination, it requires an 
understanding that power operates intentionally – the disparate actions of slave owners over 
hundreds of years were, collectively meant to assert the permeability of the black body, not as aims 
incidental to their economic interests, but first and foremost (and here the sentence moves into a 
                                                     
10 The Atlantic Press kit describes is average digital audience as having a median household income of $91, 505, 




critique of Marxism and a consideration of the race question) – without reference to the declared or 
conscious intentions of its constituents (in other words, it requires understanding Foucault’s dictate 
in History of Sexuality, Vol 1, “Power is intentional and non-subjective” (90); understanding these 
diffuse but ‘intentional’ mechanisms of power, understanding what intentionality means beyond an 
individual mindset, is a theoretically sophisticated task). The sentence finally demands an 
understanding of the ways in which the control exerted by slavery persists through time and can 
still be said to intend to deny Coates and Samori of self-possession in the present day. In short, it 
demands a versatility and comfort with several concepts deployed in race theory over the course of 
a few lines. Coates does not stop to elaborate the constituent components of these assertions so that 
they might be convincing to someone who does not immediately understand how the abstraction 
“power” intends.  
When he first recalls the interviewer’s question, he writes “the host of a popular news show 
asked me what it meant to lose my body” (6). It is immediately apparent to viewers of popular 
news shows that this is not, word for word, what she asked: it is not the language of popular news 
shows. This is an introduction to the idea that the thinking of the book is translated out of our 
(mainstream American) habitual modes of thinking, and that, to put it back into “our” language, the 
reader would need to perform a kind of translation. Statements that register to us as sounding 
mythic, passionate, and dramatic, he declares as straightforwardly factual: the interviewer asks him 
why he thinks white America’s progress was built on looting and violence, a statement she 
obviously believes is radical; he deadpans “there’s nothing extreme in this statement” (6). He does 
not argue or justify the expressively extreme statements (“Americans deify democracy”). This is 
not because he believes these claims are literally and empirically “self-evident” but because they’re 
self-evident to him, and he wants to make the reader feel his unwillingness to spend any energy 
making the language of his world transparent to us. He does not accuse, by virtue of not caring to 
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prove.  
 We can see how the refusal to accuse, by virtue of the refusal to address, situates white 
readers to recognize their own racial agency most clearly in the fact that he does not address white 
readers. He addresses readers “who believe that they are white.” In order to feel yourself accused in 
the first place, you need to assent to the idea not that you are white, or that others usually treat you 
as white, or that you have the “privilege” that, with or without your consent, comes along with 
generally being considered to be white – you have to assent to the statement that you believe 
yourself white. In order to stand even implicitly accused by the text, you have to assert active belief 
in whiteness. This is an unexpected maneuver from an author who espouses social constructivism 
and (often) believes personal intentions don’t matter, and it is designed to set the bar for 
antagonistic reading high. The only belief Coates ascribes to whiteness is the belief that you have 
the authority to plunder the black body. So a white reader, feeling accused, desiring to justify 
himself, in order to defend “white people,” must look to the contents of her own “belief” for some 
other grounds for whiteness besides the authority to plunder the black body. The term of art throws 
the white reader back onto herself, possibly to confront the emptiness of her “belief” in whiteness, 
possibly to claim whiteness in order to refute an accusation Coates has not delivered to her – either 
way, making her defensiveness laborious, multi-step, active, and thus, if not stopping the reading it 
its tracks, making it visible enough in its own initiating causality to become self-aware.  
 
III. Black Readers 
That Coates’s address to Samori performatively refuses white readers does not mean that 
the book is not also sincerely for him, and for young black people like him (perhaps: young black 
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men).13 What Coates wants for Samori is for him to come to consciousness; on the most basic 
level, he’s given him a memoir that narrates his own coming to consciousness and dramatizes the 
ways white supremacy gets into black people’s minds, conducts even one’s attraction to certain 
theories of black nationalism, draws a line across one’s mind’s horizon of possibility. But I don’t 
think Coates’s other task, addressing white readers askance, produces two wholly distinct books, as 
Cottom does: the refusal Coates performs, a refusal of antagonistic reading, which is fundamentally 
a refusal to be discursively bound by and made to justify the logic of whiteness, is what 
consciousness is useful for, the way to achieve the ‘velocity of escape’ when the news makes it 
clear that there are really no guarantees of ‘escape’ for black bodies, change is unlikely in Samori’s 
lifetime, and one’s lifetime is all there is.    
What Coates offers Samori instead of “hope” is “the struggle.” The struggle is probably the 
reason many readers see Between the World and Me as pessimistic and anti-activist: it has a 
mysterious, Stoic bent to it that seems to suggest that black people should overcome racism by 
learning to mentally rise above it. Coates first introduces the struggle as “the question of how one 
should live within a black body, within a country lost in the Dream…and the pursuit of this 
question, I have found, ultimately answers itself” (12). The question answers itself because it is 
“unanswerable, which is not to say futile. The greatest reward of this constant interrogation, of 
confrontation with the brutality of my country, is that it has freed me from ghosts and girded me 
against the sheer terror of disembodiment” (12). The reward of the struggle, which is to say, 
consciousness, sounds obscurely and maybe unconvincingly metaphysical in its rewards, even un-
characteristically religious, a state of enlightenment in which an unanswerable question answers 
                                                     
13I think the book desires to address young black people. It expresses this desire by including the figures of black girls 
whose lives are shaped by what Coates thinks of as the same fear that shapes black boys’ lives on the street, by 
including black women who were brutalized by police in the lists of the dead, by figuring a black woman as the 
specific slave whose whole life was lived in suffering. Whether he successfully does so is an open question. For 
critiques of Coates’s failure to consider gender, see Cottom, Bennett, Hilton. 
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itself, and provides an inexplicable fearlessness. But actually what Coates offers via “the struggle” 
is a much more practical guide for survival: a psychological tool to enable refusal. 
If antagonistic reading of blackness is a rigged trap that seeks to convert black people’s 
natural responses and natural anger, their natural fear, into something that gives the reader ‘a 
reason’ (a reason that is always already the cause of any transgression), allowing themselves to live 
in ignorance, totally absorbed in the cosmopolitan world that believes it is post-racial (the scene of 
Samori’s youth), is to allow themselves to be disappointed, fearful, and angry, which is to allow 
themselves to be sucked in. To be affected and surprised by every fresh reminder of white 
supremacy is to risk making the mistake of being pulled under by anger and fear. In the narrative 
aftermath of Howl’s Moving Castle, Coates recounts a litany of the things white people would 
rather countenance than relinquish their belief in their own whiteness – a man chocked to death on 
film, the belief that a teenager holding candy and soda is a monster, Prince Jones followed through 
three jurisdictions, the pushing of his four-year-old son like just an obstacle in their day. He 
concludes this litany: 
I was there, Samori. No. I was back in Baltimore surrounded by them boys. I was on my 
parents’ living room floor, staring out at that distant world, impenetrable to me. I was in all 
the anger of my years. I was where Eric Garner must have been in his last moments—“This 
stops today,” he said and was killed. I felt the cosmic injustice, even though I did not fully 
understand it. I had not yet been to Gettysburg. I had not read Thavolia Glymph. All I had 
was the feeling, the weight. But part of what I know is that there is the burden of living 
among Dreamers, and there is the extra burden of your country telling you the Dream is 
just, noble, and real, and you are crazy for seeing the corruption and smelling the sulfur. For 
their innocence, they nullify your anger, your fear, until you are coming and going, and you 
find yourself inveighing against yourself—“Black people are the only people who…”—
really inveighing against your own humanity and raging against the crime in your ghetto, 
because you are powerless before the great crime of history that brought the ghettos to be. 
(106) 
 
All of the instances in which white supremacy exercises its power are conflated – the most trivial 
instance, the white woman shoving Samori, tantamount to the most serious murders insofar as they 
all threaten to send him to the same place, which is “back.” These antagonistic readings – a 
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protective father as beast, a teenager with his hands full of candy and soda as monster, a man 
naturally fearing the unmarked car trailing him as fleeing criminal – invite the same impotent rage, 
a rage that fuels the dynamic and works to justifies the initial reading to the reader. To feel all the 
cosmic injustice with no recourse to action can make you “slip up” by letting it slip out, can make 
you an Eric Garner – and they win. That impotent rage can make you internalize their antagonistic 
reading of you, their nullification, even make you become what they read you – and they win.  
The only way to get outside of this signifying cycle is to know how it works. Learning how 
it works is the struggle, and knowing how it works is to diminish its power to enrage you and 
allows you to refuse the cycle. Coates writes,  
By the time I visited those battlefields, I knew that they had been retrofitted as the staging 
ground for a great deception, and this was my only security, because they could no longer 
insult me by lying to me. I knew—and the most important thing I knew was that, 
somewhere deep with them, they knew too. I like to think that knowing might have kept me 
from endangering you, that having understood and acknowledged the anger, I could control 
it. I like to think that it could have allowed me to speak the needed words to the woman and 
then walk way. I like to think this, but I can’t promise it. The struggle is really all I have for 
you because it is the only portion of this world under your control. (106 – 107) 
 
The use of the struggle is that it allows you to refuse your energy, your care, your explanatory 
attention, to the antagonistic reader, whose discursive project of erasure and self-justification is 
inevitably fed by them.  
 
Conclusion: Antagonistic Readers and Speech Genres 
Towards the end of his narrative, Coates tells Samori: “I have spent much of my studies 
searching for the right question by which I might fully understand the breach between the world 
and me. I have not spent my time studying the problem of ‘race’ – ‘race’ itself is just a restatement 
and retrenchment of the problem” (115). To say that Coates sees antagonistic readers as practicing 
racism is an explanatory reversal. I’ve read The Argonauts and Between the World and Me as texts 
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profoundly interested in theorizing the antagonistic reader for the sake of their reception among 
more sympathetic readers, and for the sake of their authors’ own ability to hear their words outside 
antagonistic reading’s patterns (“It doesn’t matter to me if both of these men are mad. Their voices 
still have clarity”), but also, because antagonistic reading is an index for racism and sexism, as a 
critical end in its own right: understanding the antagonistic reader is a way of framing the question 
(i.e., “what is racism?”) without begging the question (“racism is hatred based on race”; “But what 
is race?” “Race is the child of racism”; and so on), of understanding what racism is and 
sexism/heterosexism are by understanding how they operate in our own minds, cognitively and 
psychologically. 
I agree that antagonistic reading – and being read antagonistically – is a central 
phenomenon of racism and sexism, and probably also one specific to issues of political subjectivity 
(though the social epistemologists disagree). Other writers have tracked, in their own way, 
phenomena of reception that I think fit in with what I’ve called antagonistic reading here, even if 
writers’ accounts of the impulses behind it or the modes of its operation don’t totally conform with 
the characteristics Coates’s and Nelson’s theories hold in common. Here, for example, is William 
Lloyd Garrison musing on the ante-bellum public’s reception of testimony about slavery in the 
Preface to Narrative of the Life of Frederick Douglass:  
So profoundly ignorant of the nature of slavery are many persons, that they are stubbornly 
incredulous whenever they read or listen to any recital of the cruelties which are daily 
inflicted on its victims. They do not deny that the slaves are held as property; but that 
terrible fact seems to convey to their minds no idea of injustice, exposure to outrage, or 
savage barbarity. Tell them of cruel scourgings, of mutilations and brandings, of scenes of 
pollution and blood, of the banishment of all light and knowledge, and they affect to be 
greatly indignant at such enormous exaggerations, such wholesale misstatements, such 
abominable libels on the character of the southern planters!...Skeptics of this character 
abound in society. In some few instances, their incredulity arises from a want of reflection; 
but, generally, it indicates a hatred of the light… (Narrative of the Life, Preface, 1178 – 
1179)  
 
Here is bell hooks, writing in Feminist Theory: From Margin to Center, published in 1984, about 
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the response she received from her white feminist classmates a Women’s Studies seminar at 
Stanford when she pointed out that the syllabus only assigned readings by white authors: “When I 
criticized [the lack of texts by women of color on the syllabus] white women directed an anger and 
hostility at me that was so intense I found it difficult to attend the class. When I suggested that the 
purpose of this collective anger was to create [a] psychologically unbearable [atmosphere] for 
me…I was told that they were not angry. I was the one who was angry” (32).  
Here is Judith Butler in “Endangered/Endangering: Schematic Racism and White 
Paranoia,” musing over how it was that a video that showed police beating a passive Rodney King, 
a video taken by most to be evidence against the police, could be taken by the jurors to “show” that 
King was a threat: “a juror reported that she believed that Rodney King was in ‘total control’ of the 
situation. How was this feat of interpretation accomplished? That it was achieved is not the 
consequence of ignoring the video, but rather, of reproducing the video within a racially saturated 
field of visibility. If racism pervades white perception, structuring what can and cannot appear 
within the horizon of white perception, then to what extent does it interpret in advance ‘visual 
evidence’?” (15 – 16).  
Here is Sara Ahmed in her recent Living a Feminist Life describing an experience that she 
takes as formative for young feminists:  
Through feminism you make sense of wrongs; you realize that you are not in the wrong. 
But when you speak of something as being wrong, you end up being in the wrong all over 
again. The sensation of being wronged can thus end up magnified: you feel wronged by 
being perceived as in the wrong just for pointing out that something is wrong. It is 
frustrating! And then your frustration can be taken as evidence of your frustration, that you 
speak this way, about this or that, because you are frustrated. It is frustrating to be heard as 
frustrated; it can make you angry that you are heard as angry. Or if you are angry about 
something and you are heard as an angry person (an angry black feminist or an angry 
woman of color), then what you are angry about disappears, which can make you feel even 
angrier. (38)  
 
These accounts are not coextensive with each other, but they share some of the distinguishing 
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attributes that Coates and Nelson see in antagonistic reading. Their ignorance isn’t straightforward 
lack of knowledge, Garrison writes, it’s a motivated ignorance. Figures are reduced: hooks is 
Angry, Ahmed’s feminist is Angry. Words are erased: the angry feminist can only speak anger, and 
so “what [she is] angry about disappears,” just as some of Butler’s readers, Nelson writes, hear 
only lesbian, lesbian, lesbian; the white juror’s field of visibility “interprets in advance,” so that the 
text of the video is so irrelevant that it can be made to say its own opposite. The episodes turn on 
cognitive reversal: like Coates, hooks and Ahmed imagine antagonistic reading as performing a 
kind of reversal, the speaker, by speaking, causes the problem he is reporting; the speaker is the 
emotion his speech provokes in the reader. In Butler’s account of the white jurors, Rodney King is 
always already the instigator. “They were not angry. I was angry.” The reader is emotionally 
invested in this response: they are stubbornly incredulous, they are intensely hostile, they are, in 
Butler’s article, paranoid (16).   
 Can literature intercede in this dynamic, or is the predetermination of the visual field a 
closed loop, to ask in Butler’s language? Or, to ask the same question in Coates’s language: is 
refusal of the antagonistic “trap” that resignifies whatever enters into it according to its own logic 
even possible? This essay takes as a premise that Nelson and Coates take as their premise that it is 
possible, or at least, it is worth innovatively trying. Whether Nelson and Coates’s refusal “worked” 
would require a reception study far beyond my scope, not to mention a serious investigation into 
what working means and what it would look like. I have tried to imagine, for example, how 
explosive Maggie Nelson’s claims might have been, partly by showing how conscious she is of 
how explosive her claims might have been, judging on the way leftist communities often react to 
what they see as co-optation and privilege. That her prominent reviewers said nothing of it, and 
wrote mostly glowing reviews of her sensitivity and her dismantling of exclusionary boundaries, 
might be a sign that her literary dexterity “neutralized” some antagonistic readings (ironically, 
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among reviewers on Goodreads, the most widely disliked aspect of her book by far was its 
hybridization of genres; readers either decried its “pretentious” incorporation of academic voices or 
its “naïve and unscholarly” treatment of theorists like Žižek) (Esposito, “The Argonauts,” 
Goodreads). But we might look for totally different signs of Between the World and Me 
“working”: Coates might be a writer for whom his aims are “working” if his white readers respond 
angrily. Does that mean we must agree with some of Coates’s black critics that the glowing 
reviews he received from white critics means, at best, that Between the World and Me didn’t 
“work”? The reviewing class, as these critics themselves point out, have their own aims (even 
“average readers” who post reviews on Goodreads have their own aims!); the range of responses of 
average readers of various identities are less available, both because they lack platforms and 
because some they may know their views are unpalatable to others. On the other hand, even if 
Coates’s book “reached” potentially antagonistic white readers in such a way as to diffuse and 
reorient the dynamic of reduction, erasure, and cooptation, would we count the book as “working” 
in light of the (I think genuinely unanticipated by Coates) antagonistic reading it received from 
black critics like bell hooks? 
 What we can say is that genre, in its broadest sense (in fact, in Bakhtin’s sense), plays a 
crucial role in the potentially antagonistic reading-speaking-responding dynamic. Let’s consider 
Miranda Fricker’s account of what she calls “epistemic injustice,” her model of how the social 
practice of knowledge admits of prejudice and thus allows a hearer to be “ignorant of,” which is to 
say, reject as knowledge, the words of a speaker who is offering testimony that otherwise should or 
would be considered knowledge. Most of our knowledge is gained not through our direct senses, 
but by being told: a proposition becomes the listener’s justified true belief when he properly judges 
the speaker conveying the proposition to be a good informant (“Rational Authority and Social 
Power,” 163). A good informant is someone who has qualities that indicate he is competent to 
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know that p and trustworthy to truthfully tell that he knows that p. In a one-on-one and face-to-face 
exchange of knowledge, which Fricker takes as a kind of model case, the listener who desires to 
know must make a (quick, often semi-conscious) judgment about the credibility of the speaker. 
Listeners judge the credibility of speakers “in the light of a set of background assumptions about 
how far people like him are trustworthy about things like this in relation to people like her” 
(Epistemic Injustice, 36). Fricker goes on to give an account of how identity of the speaker can 
incur a near constant credibility deficit for some speakers, such that women, for example are almost 
always judged less credible about things like this, or that, or the other, in relation to people like her, 
or him, or them; each instance of this is a testimonial injustice, and the persistent and 
disproportionate number of testimonial injustices that accrue to some kinds of people build up into 
hermeneutical injustices – certain groups, persistently assigned less credibility across a wide range 
of topics, are prevented from contributing to society’s pool of knowledge, such that the society’s 
pool of concepts lack ones that will adequately and easily describe that group’s experience 
(Fricker’s paradigmatic example is the concept “sexual harassment,” the experience of which, 
before that concept was developed, women struggled to describe and make clear with words like 
“unwanted flirting”). What is relevant and useful in her account, however, is that she sees 
credibility as being assigned by considering the relation between speaker (or writer), listener (or 
reader), and speech. The listener judges the speaker credible or competent with respect to the kinds 
of claims to knowledge they make: a woman who is judged credible to observe that this or that 
behavior in the classroom was sexist might not be judged credible in a courtroom to observe that 
this or that behavior violated Title IX. A woman can be judged as less credible generally, less 
objective than a man with respect to any kind of knowledge; similarly any kind of speaker might 
incur a credibility deficit with respect to claims to a kind of knowledge that is obscure or that 
listeners are prejudiced against (i.e., think of white readers’ resistance to believe that anything was 
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caused by race); or these factors can concur: women, who are already generally seen as more 
partial, whose speech is always more “personal” and less universal, speaking about feminism, a 
theory of political subjectivity that is already seen as failing to think about “serious” “universal” 
issues like war and the economy, are seen as not just partial but as biased, as theorizing entirely for 
their own advancement. 
 Genre, in Bakhtin’s sense – the function of speech, defined by the sphere of communication 
– determines how we characterize “things like this” in the process of judging “how far people like 
him are trustworthy about things like this in relation to people like her.” If we read testimony 
written in the language of a legal brief we understand it to be making a different kind of claim than 
testimony written in the language of a news article, even if they testify to the same facts. Bakhtin’s 
own account of speech genres says that it allows us to plot a speaker’s “speech will” and to begin 
formulating our response as they’re speaking – this allows us to use language fluently, in his 
account, but it also sounds like an account of the mental operation a listener performs to obviate a 
speaker’s actual words. Complex secondary genres intervene in this interlocutory process 
differently, from each other and from straightforward testimony and daily speech. Literature, I’m 
tentatively saying, may have a better chance of “working” with antagonistic readers (tentatively, 
because I’m keenly aware of all of literature’s disadvantages – the main one being its shrinking 
and relatively self-selecting audience), by virtue of what Bakhtin acknowledges to be its expressive 
flexibility, its room for personal style. To read literature as being produced not just by “the reader” 
but produced by the competing forces and needs of different readers, and especially by the needs of 
its most aggressively responsive and virulent readers, is to ask how those formal elements 
communicate. For example: how does fiction operate in this antagonistic dynamic? Does nonfiction 
incur a special risk of antagonistic reading by making more legible claims to knowledge than, say, 
fiction? How does narrativity influence how readers perceive and emotionally respond to those 
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claims? Coates’s and Nelson’s use of second person address is an example of how literature’s 
expressive flexibility can interrupt and redirect the antagonistic reader’s patterned responses – as 
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